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Today, the Western way of war is mainly based on conventional strategies and 
organizations, with a sense of a Clausewitzian view of war: achieving victory by 
defeating the opponent’s army. Small states have been copying the larger 
nations way of planning for war, with limited analysis of to whether this is the 
most effective strategy for them.  
Analyses of large numbers of historical cases show that a conventional 
approach is a road to defeat for small states when facing larger conventional 
opponents. Another solution might be to change the national strategy to an 
irregular one. The intention of this thesis is to illuminate the potential for small 
states to improve the effect of their military by adopting an irregular strategy. The 
thesis is based on analyses of the works of recognized military thinkers, as well 
as three distinct historical cases. Based on the irregular strategy, the authors 
have described irregular tactics, organizational principles, and enabling 
technology. 
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A. THE NATURE OF THE QUESTION 
1. The Western Way of War – The Small State’s Dilemma 
Today, the Western way of war is mainly based on conventional strategies 
and organizations, driven foremost by the United States and NATO,1 with a 
sense of a Clausewitzian view of war: achieving victory by defeating the 
opponent’s army. Small states have been copying the larger nations way of 
planning for war, with limited analysis of to whether this is the most effective 
strategy for them. 
Several small countries, including Norway, Sweden, Denmark, as well as 
other European countries, employ national strategies based on a direct 
approach: defending against a conventional force, by conventional means. Using 
Liddell Hart´s and Beaufre’s strategic theories, the nations’ chosen strategies 
seem to be more a matter of “conventional fashion” than fit, thereby risking 
military disaster in the event of conventional aggression from a larger state.2 In 
addition to the strategic analysis, common logic dictates that meeting a 
significantly more powerful opponent on the battlefield with the same general 
organization and tactics will lead to defeat.  
In the coming analysis, we will use Arreguín-Toft’s definition of a small 
state: the weaker party to an asymmetric conflict, i.e., a conflict in “which one 
side is possessed with overwhelming power with respect to its adversary.”3 We 
will assume that such states are defensive and conservative from the perspective 
                                            
1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
2 B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy. (New York: Meridian Printing, 1991); and André Beaufre, An 
Introduction to Strategy: With Particular Reference to Problems of Defense, Politics, Economics, 
and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger: 1965). 
3 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Wins Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New 
York:Cambridge University Press, 2005), xi. 
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that these states have no strategic offensive intentions, and are focused on 
preserving national integrity and sovereignty.4 This does not exclude offensive 
operations, but means that offensive operations will be conducted as adjuncts to 
a defensive strategy.  
So what are the options available to a small state in terms of national 
military strategy? There are generally four approaches, according to Sandor 
Fabian:5 
 Imitating major powers (conventional military approach) 
 Joining alliances 
 Assuming neutrality 
 Acquiring weapons of mass destruction 
Even though the use of conventional forces and strategy has been 
sometimes successful when employed against equal or inferior opponents,6 there 
are few known examples of them being effective against an overwhelming 
opponent.7 This is the scenario and context when small states imitating major 
powers are faced with an external threat from a larger nation.  
                                            
4 See Liddell Hart, Strategy, 355. 
5 Sandor Fabian, Professional Irregular Defense Forces: The Other Side of COIN (Master’s 
thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 18–26 
6 One example of successful conventional strategy being used against an inferior enemy is 
the U.S. invasion in Iraq in 1991. Another example is the German invasion of France in 1940. In 
the case of the French, they were not significantly inferior in pure numbers (the French had more 
tanks), but their strategy was clearly inferior to the German Blitzkrieg. 
7 Herodotus, The History of Herodotus, George Rawlinson, trans.  vol. 4 (New York: D. 
Appleman and Company, 1885). Accessed March 19, 2013,  http://www.shsu.edu 
/~his_ncp/Herother.html.  
Although such cases are far between, some do exist. One historical case where a smaller 
force made significant impact is the battle of Thermopylae in 480 B.C., where some 3,500 Greeks 
held their ground —a narrow mountain pass—for seven days against an invading Persian force 
numbering over 100,000. 
Another case is “Operation Compass” in North Africa in December 1940 to February 1941, 
where a British force of 31,000 men overran an Italian force numbering 150,000, taking 130,000 
Italians prisoner and killing 3,000. Kennedy Hickman, World War II: Operation Compass. 
Accessed March 19, 2013, About.com, http://militaryhistory.about.com 
/od/worldwarii/p/compass.htm.  
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Can, and should, a small state build its strategy based on an alliance in 
what may become a destabilizing strategic situation? That is a risky game. Walt 
argues that “[allying] with the dominant power means placing one’s trust in its 
continued benevolence.”8  A decisive question would be: Will the greater power 
honor the alliance commitment and security guarantees when the security 
situation gets worse? The questions of honoring alliance commitments also come 
into play in alliances between states of more equal power. James D Fearon 
raises the issue in “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests.”9 According to Fearon the 
most frequently cited study (Sabrosky, 1980), figures a 27% reliability of 
alliances’ commitment in war. Fearon criticizes the study because the settings do 
not examine the question of commitment when the specific terms of the 
agreement apply, and claims that therefore the study is not relevant. According to 
Fearon, there is only one study done under these specific settings.10 That study’s 
results point at 88% honored alliances in war.  
The opinions amongst scholars diverge, but the question is important, and 
there are logical considerations leading to an answer: rationality and security. As 
the situation deteriorates, the allied great power will reconsider its calculations to 
optimize gains. Is the support of the small power ex ante worth the costs ex 
post? The decision to honor the commitment, or not, will depend on the situation 
and the great power’s cost-benefit calculation: how might the aggressor benefit, 
and can the protective great power afford that cost?11 This calculation risks 
leading to a situation where different countries within the alliance have different 
priorities, thus leaving the small nation alone. Two examples of that possibility 
are the Polish-British defense pact of 1939, and Hitler’s piecemeal method from 
                                            
8 Stephen M Waltz, “Alliances Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International 
Security 9, no. 4 (1985): 5. 
9 James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” 
The Journal of Conflict Resolutions, 41, no. 1 (1997): 85–86. 
10 Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests,” 86. 
11 The calculation might include factors as costly signals and reputation, losing face, the 
small state’s geopolitical situation, etc. (authors’ remark). 
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1936 to 1939, expanding the area under his control piece by piece while not 
upsetting the Allies.     
Joining an alliance does not mean that a nation is necessarily given a free 
ride by the major powers. One such example is that as a NATO member, each 
member state has an obligation to maintain a credible national defense structure, 
with a minimum percentage of GDP going to the military forces each year.  
Small states who are part of an alliance also face a strategic dilemma: 
Should they shape their military forces along the same lines of the larger nations, 
even though these mini-versions of conventional forces will not be able to 
produce the desired effects? An even riskier solution might be to specialize, 
training and equipping the nation´s military forces only for a few specific tasks as 
part of an allied combined force. This might work as long as the alliance works 
together well, but what happens if priorities change? Rebuilding a force with a 
wide-spectrum set of capabilities takes years, and cannot be done on short 
notice in a time of emergency. Another solution for a small state might be to go 
their own way by creating credible forces that are not similar to those of the 
larger nations in the alliance. 
Neutrality is a gamble, basing national security on the premise that a 
potential aggressor will see that the predicted cost associated with invading will 
be higher than the predicted gains. One example of neutrality is Sweden in World 
War II, where it managed to stay neutral throughout the war, while neighboring 
nations like Denmark and Norway were occupied by Germany. While this might 
seem a successful approach, Norway tried to do the same, and failed. There are 
several reasons for this, but the main reason was the geostrategic position of 
Norway – the Atlantic coastline was far too important for the Germans for them 
not to attack. On the other hand, Sweden managed to maneuver diplomatically, 
maintaining trade cooperation with Germany throughout the war. Consequently, 
there were few incentives for Germany to invade Sweden, as they reached their 
objectives without conflict.  
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The above cases are examples of an interesting dilemma for states 
seeking neutrality: they do not decide themselves if they can stay neutral – the 
opposition decides that. To summarize, a neutral state is in the utmost vulnerable 
situation, with no one else to support it in the case of an attack. It is therefore 
even more important for a small state to maintain a credible military organization, 
in addition to using all the other national instruments of power skillfully. 
Acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is an approach that is not 
applicable in most situations. While some small states do have such weapons,12 
acquiring them will most likely be unacceptable for most democracies today 
because of their own political constraints. Countries without such internal 
limitations have experienced that there are significant costs in terms of sanctions 
from the international community linked to the development, possession, and 
even more the use of, such weapons.  
So – based on the above analysis, none of the four strategies guarantee 
the small state´s sovereignty and integrity. This leads us to seek out other 
possibilities. One option might be to use an irregular approach, employing 
irregular warfare principles, which have been used successfully in a number of 
situations through history. This thesis will aim at answering the following 
questions: 
Research Question: Is an irregular warfare approach to national military 
strategy appropriate for small states? If so, how can these principles be 
applied? 
 
Hypothesis: By using principles of IW, combined with a well equipped13, 
trained, and designed organization, a small nation can increase the 
military effect of its military forces.  
                                            
12 One example of a small state with WMDs is Israel. Although Israel has never publicly 
acknowledged that they possess nuclear weapons, they are widely believed to have them. 
Another example is Pakistan, which is not a small nation, but is defined as a small state relative 
to neighboring India. (Authors’ remark) 
13 “Well equipped” meaning supplying such forces with modern technology to the extent it 
provides an advantage. (Authors’ remark) 
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B. REVIEW OF CURRENT RESEARCH 
Choosing the optimal way of defending a country is an important task, and 
it could mean the difference between maintaining or losing national sovereignty. 
There are several ways of thinking when it comes to designing the defense 
strategy for a small nation. A shaping factor for all the different strategies is that a 
small nation with limited resources will never be able to beat a much larger 
opposing force if the “playing field” is even. Some authors have argued that 
nations should focus more on unconventional, networked approaches. John 
Arquilla has pointed in his works both towards a high success rate for irregular 
forces when fighting a conventional opponent14, but also towards the fact that the 
use of unconventional forces by the U.S. has been highly successful in several 
cases.15 Other contributions, including the recent work by Max Boot, have 
backed Arquilla’s research when it comes to showing the relative strengths of 
irregular forces.16  
Based on all these sources, a convincing point could be made that the 
principles of guerrilla warfare and unconventional warfare could be applied to the 
entire defensive forces of a small nation, thus giving a higher relative effect. This 
would lead to a total transformation for most small countries defense forces. One 
proponent of such significant change is Norway’s former Chief of Defense, Gen 
(ret) Sverre Diesen, who has proclaimed the demise of the tank and mechanized 
infantry, wanting instead to focus on a networked force based on lighter units.17  
His claim is that smaller units, working in a highly networked organization, 
utilizing modern technology, will achieve more than small, conventional units. He 
has, not surprisingly, been met with opposing views by a number of people, 
including the current commander of the Norwegian Brigade North, Brigadier Gen. 
                                            
14 For further reading, see John Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits (Chicago: Ivan R 
Dee, 2011). 
15 For further reading, see John Arquilla, Worst Enemy (Chicago: Ivan R Dee, 2008). 
16 Max Boot, Invisible Armies (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013). 
17 Sverre Diesen, “Er mekaniske styrkers storhetstid forbi?” (“Is the time of greatness over 
for mechanized forces?”), Norsk Militært Tidsskrift nr. 4 (2012). 
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Odin Johannesen, who claims that such an approach is far too fragile for the 
modern battlefield.18 This leads to another challenge when proposing wide-
reaching change: bureaucracies are reluctant to change. Stakeholders in the 
current organizations will meet proposals of change with resistance, especially if 
“their” part of the organization will disappear or be significantly changed.  
Even larger countries have contemplated incorporating lessons from IW in 
their conventional forces. In the U.S. Marine Corps 2005 Publication A Concept 
for Distributed Operations, an IW-based approach is presented:  
Distributed Operations describes an operating approach that will create an 
advantage over an adversary through the deliberate use of separation and 
coordinated, interdependent, tactical actions enabled by increased access to 
functional support, as well as by enhanced combat capabilities at the small-unit 
level. The essence of this concept lies in the capacity for coordinated action by 
dispersed units, throughout the breadth and depth of the battlespace, ordered 
and connected within an operational design focused on a common aim.19 
From a strategic perspective there are two main routes: direct and indirect 
strategy. The direct strategy is used when a state has the military capacity to 
impose its will, or create a decisive situation by military victory. This approach is 
supported by Clausewitz in his On War, and is the common theory in military 
conventional strategy. 
The challenge for small states is that they do not possess the resources to 
use a direct strategy, i.e., a strategy to deter and impose their will on an 
opponent by military means. This leads to the use of an indirect strategy, seeking 
a decisive situation with other means than military victory, while avoiding a 
decisive military battle against a military superior enemy.   
                                            
18 Odin Johannesen, “Hær og nå, i alle dimensjoner!” (“Here/Army and now, in all 
dimensions!”) Norsk Militært Tidsskrift nr. 4 (2012). 
19 Department of the Navy, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, “A Concept for Distributed 
Operations,” (Washington, D.C., 2005). 
 8 
This conclusion raises two questions: on what theory should a (grand) 
strategy for a small state be based; and what are the guiding principles for such a 
strategy? 
Two strategists who answered the first question concerning indirect 
strategy are B.H. Liddell Hart and André Beaufre.20 Liddell Hart’s main points in 
his study of indirect strategy is the use of economy of force and psychological 
blows, thereby dislocating the enemy, physically by mobility, and psychologically 
by surprise: “When a government appreciates that the enemy has the military 
superiority, it may wisely enjoin a strategy of limited aims.”21 This strategy is 
based on raiding, forcing the enemy to distribute of his forces widely, and 
exhausting the enemy´s moral and physic energy.22  
Beaufre’s main point is to use a strategic plan based on the importance of 
the issue at stake, relative resources and freedom of action. He presents a 
concept built on two maneuvers: the exterior (grand strategy), to create freedom 
of action; and the interior (military strategy), based on the state’s material 
resources, moral assets, time and place.23 
Beaufre’s and Liddell Hart´s theories are supported by Arreguín-Toft´s 
theory of strategic interaction. He claims that in an asymmetric conflict opposite 
strategic approaches favor the weaker actor.24 
Even though many define Irregular Warfare (IW) as guerrilla war, the 
concept includes a gamut of different methods. The basic idea is to wear down 
the opponent by using indirect methods and avoid conventional confrontations. 
                                            
20 See Liddell Hart, Strategy, and Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy. 
21 Liddell Hart, Strategy, 320. 
22 Liddell Hart, Strategy, 321. 
23 Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 110–120. 
24 Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 18. 
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Mao Tse-Tung also describes the principles for IW in his work On Protracted War 
where he points at seven rules as the basis for guerrilla warfare.25 
Liddell Hart also pays attention to the “camouflaged war,” or guerrilla war, 
and offers some strategic principles about the pros and cons of such an 
approach.26 Beaufre answers the second question, regarding the principles for 
irregular warfare, in his concept of “the inner maneuver,” referred to as the 
erosion model. His theory is based, inter alia, on Mao and T.E. Lawrence. 
Clausewitz addresses five principles of IW in On War in the chapter of People’s 
War.27 According to Clausewitz, IW must be “nebulous and elusive; its resistance 
should never materialize as a concrete body . . . On the other hand, there must 
be some concentration at certain points: the fog must thicken and form a dark 
and menacing cloud out of which a bolt of lightning may strike at any time.”28 T. 
E. Lawrence is also  
Altogether, the above-mentioned works lead to certain distinctive 
characteristics, or principles, for using irregular warfare as part of the military 
strategy. These principles are further supported in Sandor Fabian’s thesis 
Professional Irregular Forces: the Other Side of the COIN where the author has 
studied six different wars where IW was used by the smaller state, or actor.      
While a number of important insights have been gained through research 
concerning irregular approaches to fighting a military superior opponent, we are 
not aware of any attempt to connect strategic theory and historical evidence into 
an overarching strategic and tactical concept for small states using irregular 
warfare. This thesis intends to fill this important gap: the further analysis will 
focus on how to implement the lessons learned from irregular warfare into a 
military strategy for small states to increase military effect. Furthermore, the 
                                            
25 Tse-Tung, Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare. Translated by Samuel B Griffith II 
(Chicago:University of Illinois Press, 2000), 21–24. 
26 Liddell Hart, Strategy, 361–370. 
27 Clausewitz, On War, 480. 
28 Clausewitz, On War, 481. 
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research will include an overarching strategy, and the implementation of irregular 
principles into tactics, command and control, and organization. 
C. DESCRIPTION OF THE METHOD 
To answer the research question, the focus in the first part of the research 
will be to analyze what strategy a small state should implement in order to uphold 
integrity and sovereignty. The second part will answer the question about how 
the chosen strategy can be supported by using irregular warfare principles. The 
third part will focus on implementing that strategy and irregular warfare principles 
into a concept for small states. This part will be supported by organizational 
design.  
Our intent is to build this thesis upon the following methods: 
 Analysis of strategic theory, to guide the choice of strategy  
 Analysis of historical data, to show general effect of irregular warfare 
 Further case studies of relevant cases, to derive success factors for 
choice of tactics and design 
 Organizational design, by using existing theory and derived success 
factors to design an organization that fits the environment 
1. Analysis of Overarching Strategy 
In this section, a further detailed analysis of the works of recognized 
thinkers, such as those previously noted, will be augmented by a wider analysis 
of other sources. 
2. Analysis of the Historical Evidence 
The research concerning irregular warfare is significant: a great deal of 
data has been analyzed, explaining both the successes and failures for forces 
employing irregular warfare. There are also a significant number of sources 
describing relevant IW principles. In this part of the research we will offer 
historical evidence, supported by recognized strategists. The thesis will build on 
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this knowledge and develop the data into a useful base for a new strategy and 
organization of small states defense forces.  
By drawing the conclusions of the research in irregular warfare from 
historical examples, we can identify the factors that influenced the outcomes of 
the conflicts, i.e., observable implications or data. In practical terms, this means 
that factors that have been leading to success should be implemented, while 
factors that have been leading to failure should be mitigated. This implementation 
or mitigation of factors should only be undertaken after careful consideration of 
their applicability in the situation at hand. All historical experiences might not 
necessarily be applicable in all cases. 
3. Identifying Factors: The Data  
The research will be made in a set of logical steps. First we will collect 
data from previous research, combined with a broader set of cases in order to 
identify the factors that lead to the outcome. This step will help identify conflicts 
where forces using conventional tactics have confronted forces using IW tactics. 
This will give enable us to identify strengths and weaknesses of IW, and define 
which factors lead to success or failure.  
The next step will be to deepen the case studies – to make the observable 
implications credible. The conditions considered will include the following:  
Political environment. 
National culture. 
Geostrategic position – meaning political and strategic considerations 
 based on a state´s geographical position.   
Geography – meaning the physical environment of a state. 
Military resources. 
National resources. 
The cases that will be analyzed have been chosen based on their 
relevance to the research question: the effect of irregular warfare as a military 
strategy for small states. While there are numerous cases showing the use of 
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some of these principles by guerrillas and insurgents, the cases of states (or 
state-like entities) employing IW are fewer. In addition to this, the chosen cases 
are spread in time over more than a century, and geographically across three 
continents. This might disprove any idea that IW only works under a narrow set 
of limiting factors. The cases that will be analyzed are the following:  
The Boer Wars (1880–1881 and 1899–1902). The Boer Wars are very 
interesting cases from an IW perspective. The First Boer War, fought in South 
Africa from December 1880 to March 1881 was a result of a power struggle 
between Dutch settlers (the “Boer”) and the British Empire over control. Lacking 
any conventional military organization, the Boers created militia units with local 
connections, utilizing the high levels of field craft and shooting skills among the 
settlers. The local units were called “commandos.”29 The commandos even 
elected their own leaders.30 The Boers used camouflage, local knowledge, and 
shooting skills to inflict serious damage to the conventional British troops, who 
were operating in the open, dressed in the brightly colored uniforms of the time. 
The commando units were self-reliant, and used their own initiative to guide their 
actions. They used their horse-based mobility to their advantage: “The 
commando formation for driving home an attack was a loose swarm intent on 
outflanking the opponents.”31  
After a series of defeats, including the crushing blow at Majuba where the 
British suffered a 46% casualty rate, the British pulled out. In August 1881, the 
Pretoria Convention was signed, giving limited independence to the Transvaal 
region. In 1884, The London Convention of 27 February 1884 was signed, giving 
full internal independence to the Boers in Transvaal.32 
                                            






After increasing tension from the late 1880s, the second Boer War erupted 
in 1899. The Boers had increased their strength significantly since the first war, 
basing their militia on general conscription.33 They had also acquired large 
numbers of German Mauser rifles, enabling them to precisely engage targets at 
longer distances than the British.34 The organization was still based on the 
“commandos,” with a size of between 100 and 150 men. 
The increased strength in the form of manpower and arms was probably 
the reason for a shift in tactics, compared to the first Boer War. The Boer 
attacked British forces head on, and in a single week in December 1899 – the 
“Black Week” – three attacks cost the British 3,000 killed and wounded.35 
Following this, the British increased their forces in South Africa to 250,000 men in 
the first months of 1900. As a result of this increase, the Boers had to pull back 
from their newly acquired areas. It could seem like the retreating forces were 
beaten, but in reality they were just changing tactics again. The Boer went back 
to their more irregular way of fighting, and soon achieved improved results.36 
Christian Rudolf de Wet had fought in the first Boer War, and now, at the 
age of 45, he was back in the saddle as commandant-general of the Free State. 
De Wet had no military background before the first war, but he had shown an 
aptitude for irregular warfare, naturally understanding how to exploit the British 
weaknesses. He understood the need for quick and decisive action, employing 
speed in all phases of his operations.37 His successes included the ambush of a 
British convoy at Sanna´s Post, where he attacked the British flank, forcing them 
to retreat into a prepared ambush. The British lost 200 killed and wounded, as 
well as over 400 taken prisoners. De Wet only lost eight killed or wounded.38  
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Such defeats led to a change in the British approach, both on the 
operational and tactical level. The number of soldiers increased, their patrolling 
became much more aggressive, and eventually the British also started targeting 
the civilian population in an attempt to cut off the local support to the guerillas. 
This hard-handed approach led a number of Boers to surrender, but the 
remaining hardliners went even more irregular. De Wet split up his commandos 
in even smaller units and dispersed them in an attempt to lower their profile, but 
also force the British forces to divide their forces.39 
The new approach gave the Boers the ability to fight on, although they 
were becoming increasingly tired and dispirited. De Wet and his forces spent 
most of their time evading, and had little ability to inflict serious damage to the 
British. Finally, in May 1902, a mutual peace agreement was reached. The final 
treaty was good enough that De Wet signed it. Although the Boers did not end up 
winning the war, this might be seen as an example of a weaker power achieving 
better results by mounting a fierce resistance.40 By adjusting their approach in an 
increasingly irregular way, the Boers managed to achieve the most critical goal 
for an irregular force: not losing. 
The Winter War in Finland (1939–1940). When Finland was attacked by 
the Soviet Union in late November 1939, it was not anything close to an even 
match, in terms of pure numbers. The Soviet forces massively outnumbered the 
Finnish defenders, both in terms of manpower and materiel. The attacking force 
consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 14th Army. The largest of these was the 7th Army, 
alone having “between twelve and fourteen divisions, with three tank brigades, 
and one mechanized corps attached (1,000 tanks and other vehicles).”41 Each of 
the divisions had an official strength of 17,000 men.42 The other Armies were 
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smaller, but still had between three and six divisions plus attached 
reinforcements. The Soviets were planning on a blitz-krieg style attack, expecting 
the fighting to be over in less than two weeks.43  
The Finnish Army meeting this force was limited in funding and training. 
The Army numbered a total of ten divisions of 14,000 men each, plus an 
additional three with limited or no equipment. Ammunition supplies and fuel were 
expected to last only between 20 and 60 days.44 What the Finns had, though, 
was the right mindset and ability to use what little resources they had. They 
developed their tactics and methods to fit their resources and more importantly, 
the terrain they would be fighting in. The dense Finnish forests “dictated a heavy 
emphasis on individual initiative and small-unit operations, quasi-guerrilla style. 
Marksmanship, mental agility, woodcraft, orienteering, camouflage, and physical 
conditioning were stressed, and parade-ground niceties were given short 
shrift.”45 
The Finnish Army did not end up fighting a purely irregular war, though. 
Much of the fighting consisted of defending pre-established fortified defensive 
lines, suffering through artillery barrages, as well as infantry and tank attacks. In 
these cases, the Finns had to bow to the sheer mass of the Soviet attacks, 
though they generally fought hard and bravely. However, when irregular tactics 
were used, they experienced repeated successes. These operations ranged from 
isolated sniper attacks, to small nighttime ambushes, to large coordinated attacks 
on advancing soviet convoys. They developed their own “motti” (meaning 
encirclement) tactics to do this. In one case, using “motti” tactics at the battle of 
Suomossalmi, Finnish units managed to stop, contain, split, and isolate two 
Soviet divisions. This operation lasted from December 23, 1939, to January 8, 
1940, with temperatures around minus 30 degrees Celsius. In the end, total 
Soviet losses were around 27,500 killed. The Soviets also lost 43 tanks, 270 
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vehicles, as well as six artillery pieces. The Finns suffered 900 dead and 1,770 
wounded. 
Despite all the Finnish successes, the Soviets won the war in the end. The 
lack of external support, lack of weapons and ammunition, as well as the inability 
to stop the massive Soviet attacks with the conventional defense finally led to a 
Finnish surrender in March 1940. The victory came at a high cost for the Soviets 
though, and the losses were highly asymmetric. Even though the Finns were 
clearly the inferior force, in both numbers and equipment, they lost “only” around 
25,000 dead. The Soviets lost around ten times that number, with estimates 
ranging between 230,000 and 270,000.46 
The essence of the fight was caught in the farewell order to the Finnish 
Army soldiers from their commander, Field Marshal Gustav Mannerheim: 
That an army so inferior in numbers and equipment, should have 
inflicted such serious defeats on an overwhelmingly powerful 
enemy, and, while retreating, have over and over again repelled his 
attacks, is a thing for which it is hard to find a parallel in the history 
of war. But it is equally admirable that the Finnish people, face to 
face with an apparently hopeless situation, were able to resist 
giving in to despair, and instead to grow in devotion and greatness. 
Such a nation has earned the right to live.47 
The first Chechen War (1994–1996). In December 1994, Russian forces 
entered Chechnya in order to quash the local attempt at liberating themselves 
from Russia. In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
Chechens had held a presidential election, and the winner, Dzokhar Dudayev, 
was operating at cross-purposes with the desires of the leaders in Moscow.  
The invasion – or intervention – was supposed to be a quick and simple 
one. The Russians forces were not properly prepared for anything but a simple 
demonstration of power. The Chechens, on the other hand, were well prepared, 
both mentally and physically, for an extended irregular fight with the Russians. 
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The Chechen forces were led by Aslan Maskhadov, a former colonel in the 
Soviet Army. In spite of his background as a conventional army officer (he served 
in the artillery), Maskhadov showed a talent for irregular warfare.48 In cooperation 
with his subordinates, he managed to organize, equip, and train a force to exploit 
the strengths of the urban defense, as well as the vulnerabilities of the advancing 
Russian forces. Maskhadov based his defense on properly prepared, well 
coordinated defensive positions, which took advantage of the limitations of the 
Russian vehicles in the urban terrain. Maskhadov did not attempt do 
micromanage his units, his motto was “less centralization, more coordination.”49  
The Chechen approach is an example of a very irregular approach to war. 
It is also an example of the effects of fighting along the same lines that the 
military organization has been trained and prepared. While there are numerous 
examples through history of conventional armies turning irregular after first being 
beaten, the Chechens went irregular from the start. This means they were ready 
when the Russians arrived, and never had to go through a painful and time-
consuming rebuilding phase to update their tactics and organization. 
It is also worth mentioning the Chechen approach to information 
operations. They gave journalists “virtually unlimited access to Grozny,”50 
allowing them to spread their stories to the world. They also created situations 
where Russian return fire destroyed civilian houses, as well as schools and 
hospitals.51 The journalists were given full access to the scenes of such 
destruction, which supported the story of the Chechen underdogs heroically 
fighting the brutal Russians. 
In the end, the massive losses the Chechens inflicted on the Russian 
forces, combined with pressure in the form of successful terrorist-style attacks, 
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as well as very limited Russian popular support for the war, led to a negotiated 
cease-fire agreement. Aslan Maskhadov and Russian Aleksandr Lebed signed 
the agreement on August 22, 1996, thereby ending the war. Subsequently, 
Russian forces pulled out of Chechnya.  
4. Coordination of Identified Factors and Theory 
In this step the identified factors will be linked with theories of strategy, 
irregular warfare, and principles of netwar.52 The result will be the guiding 
principles for the organizational design.  
The proposed strategy will be based on strategists and conclusions given 
in the case studies. Proposed tactics will be based on the factors identified in the 
case studies and the implementation of modern technology. Finally, the 
organization will be designed to fit the environment, based on the previous 
analyses. 
5. Implementation 
The identified success factors, in coordination with theory, will provide the 
conclusion and foundation for implementation of the right strategy, tactics, 
organization, and technology. Using the relevant theory for organizational design, 
an organization based on the previously derived principles and guidelines will be 
constructed. In addition to the organization itself, the following issues will be 
addressed: 
 How should the proposed changes in national strategy be 
implemented? 
 How should the chosen strategy be broken down into tactical 
guidelines and organization? 
 How should the advantages of modern technology be 
implemented? 
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 19 
Our hypothesis is that an advantage can be achieved by using IW 
principles. By shifting focus, both in terms of priorities and investments, from 
heavy equipment to small, light units using effective tactics, we believe that a 
small state can increase its military capabilities significantly. Thereby, it can 
increase its chances of success across a range of scenarios, not only against 
conventional threats. Another important effect of basing an organization on IW 
principles is that it might be better suited for fighting an unconventional enemy. It 
is a historic fact that several of the threats in international operations that 








II. THE SMALL STATE’S STRATEGY 
In order to explore the question of whether an irregular warfare approach 
is appropriate to a small state’s national military strategy, this chapter will discuss 
strategy in general, and military strategy for small states specifically. Based on 
the findings, the chapter will outline a strategy for small states. The discussions 
are mainly based on the works of two military strategists, André Beaufre and B.H. 
Liddell Hart.  
A. WHAT IS “THE SMALL STATE?” 
What is a small state? According to Jeanne Hey, attempts at definitions 
“have included geographic size, population size as measure, and a country’s 
degree of influence in international affairs.”53 Rothstein, on the other hand, 
defines a small state as “[a] state, which recognizes that it can not obtain security 
primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely on the aid of 
others.”54 Arreguín-Toft generally defines small (i.e., weak) states as states that 
find themselves as the weaker side in a military asymmetric conflict.55 
According to Liddell Hart, states are of two kinds: the acquisitive state and 
the conservative state. The former is primarily concerned with conquests. The 
latter is more concerned with preserving its security and maintaining territorial 
boundaries.56 This grouping of states does not imply whether a state is small or 
large, but describes a state’s intentions. Based on inherent capacities, a small 
state is bound to be conservative.          
                                            
53 Jeanne A Hey, Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior. (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers Inc, Boulder, Colorado, 2003), 2. 
54 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1968), 29. 
55 Ivan Arreguín-Toft How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), xi. 
56 Liddell Hart, Strategy, 355. 
 22 
The key to a valid definition is to view the small state in comparison to 
something larger or greater. By doing that, we put the small state in a context. 
For the purpose of this chapter, the definition of a small state is based on the 
context of conflict and war. This will lead to a definition based on factors including 
the comparison of military capabilities (size, technology, strategy, tactics), as well 
as capabilities to create international support, coalitions and alliances; i.e., 
extended military capacity, by the use of diplomacy and psychological warfare.    
Great powers are those states with the military capability to influence and 
impose their own national interests and objectives by acting offensively outside 
their own territory, either regionally or globally. This capability can be used in 
order to coerce, occupy areas of interest, conduct limited war, show force etc. 
Smaller states, on the other hand, lack the great powers’ offensive military 
capacity to influence. These states are thus forced to implement their national 
strategy and use their statecraft and instruments of power in other ways in order 
to protect national interests and sovereignty. 
Based on this analysis, we can identify a couple of central factors defining 
small states. First, small states are those states whose militaries would be 
considered significantly inferior in comparison to their opponent in a military 
asymmetric conflict. Second, small states are generally defensive and, to use 
Liddell Hart’s notion, conservative from the perspective that these states have no 
strategic offensive intention. This does not, however, exclude offensive 
operations in support of a general defensive strategy.  
B. WHAT IS STRATEGY? 
According to Beaufre, “The art of strategy consists in choosing the most 
suitable means available” and combining them  “to produce a psychological 
pressure sufficient to achieve the moral effect required.”57  Beaufre continues by 
making a sub-division of strategy into different fields of a conflict. At the top is the 
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total strategy; below that we find the overall strategy of the different fields 
(military, political, economic and diplomatic). Each field has its own operational 
strategy.58 These fields run the gamut of means available.  
Liddell Hart, as well as Beaufre, makes the distinction of strategic levels 
based on the responsibilities between the government and the military leaders. 
While the Government is responsible of the sphere of policy (Grand strategy), the 
military leaders tend to have operational control of the military.59 Grand strategy 
encompasses not only fighting power, but will also include financial, diplomatic 
and ethical pressure to weaken an opponent’s will.60 
This initial identification of strategy is important and leads to some 
important conclusions. First, military strategy cannot be seen in isolation. Military 
strategy must be put in a context, as one of several instruments of power for a 
nation. Military power and strategy are just two of several means and strategies a 
nation uses in order to protect national interests. Military power and strategy are 
sometimes supported by other means, and at other times, they support those 
other means. The combination of means and strategies is called statecraft or 
grand strategy; according to Van de Velde, it is “the process through which a 
nation attempts to minimize its weakness and limitation, and to maximize its 
strength and capabilities in a current international situation.”61 
Secondly, the above identification of strategy leads to a recognition that 
there is a distinction between the political and the military levels and their roles in 
strategy. According to Beaufre, the political focus is on public opinion, what the 
public wants and can accept, while the military focus is on the employment of 
available military resources to produce a given result, defined by the political 
level.62  
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Third, it shows the overall responsibilities of the political level in 
coordinating, controlling, and using different instruments of power, or national 
resources, including economy, diplomacy, and information.  
C. WHAT IS MILITARY STRATEGY? 
From Beaufre’s point of view, military strategy is “the art of applying force 
so that it makes the most effective contribution towards achieving the ends set by 
political policy.”63 [Military] strategy, per se, is defined as “the art of the dialectic 
of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.”64  
The aim, he continues, “ . . . is to force the enemy to accept the terms we 
wish to impose on him. In this dialectic of wills a decision is achieved when a 
certain psychological effect has been produced on the enemy: when he becomes 
convinced that it is useless to start or alternatively to continue the struggle.”65 
According to Liddell Hart military strategy is “ the art of distributing and 
applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”66 For success, strategy 
depends on “a sound calculation and co-ordination of the end and the mean.”67 
Liddell Hart defines the aim of military strategy as “ to bring about [the] battle 
under the most advantageous circumstances. And the more advantageous the 
circumstances, the less, proportionately, will be the fighting. The perfection of 
strategy would be, therefore, to produce a decision without any serious 
fighting.”68 
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In summary Liddell Hart means that “[t]he true aim is not so much to seek 
battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself 
produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this.”69 
From this discussion we can draw some important conclusions. First, The 
central part of military strategy in the dialectic struggle is the will: the opponent’s 
realization that to start or continue a struggle will impose more costs than 
benefits on him. Though the military strategy is guided by an overall strategy, the 
costs will be subjective, depending on the opponent’s objective and 
prerequisites. Second, what is “the most advantageous circumstance” and what 
is the “advantageous strategic situation”? The answer lies in arranging the 
nation’s resources in the most cost effective way, i.e., getting the most “bang for 
the buck,” to include creating a strategic situation based on the nation´s inherent 
resources and strategic conditions. These conditions and resources include the 
economic, military, diplomatic, and information capabilities, as well as the 
geopolitical situation and specific geography. 
D. THE STRATEGIC WAYS: DIRECT OR INDIRECT STRATEGY 
So, how can a small state minimize weaknesses and limitations, while 
maximizing strengths and capabilities? How can a small state convince an 
opponent of the futility of starting or continuing the struggle, and make a conflict 
appear more costly than beneficial to an opponent? The answers are to be found 
in the execution of “the art of applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy,” 
i.e., the choice of the strategic way. 
1.  Direct Strategy 
The direct strategy is used when a state has the military capacity to 
impose its will on an opponent. Military force can be used to threaten, coerce, 
deter, or compel an adversary, or to achieve a decisive decision or situation by 
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the use of military actions and victory.70 This approach is supported by 
Clausewitz´ On War, and is the common theory in military conventional strategy.  
The definition of direct strategy leads to conventional or traditional 
warfare. This warfare is described by the U.S. Department of Defense as “[A] 
form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, 
in which the objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an 
adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a 
change in an adversary’s government or policies.”71 In summary, direct strategy 
is the strategy for the militarily stronger/superior. For a small state, with an 
inferior conventional military capability, this is obviously not a viable solution.  
2. Indirect Strategy 
According to Beaufre, “the essential feature of indirect strategy is that it 
seeks to obtain a result by methods other than military victory.”72 A main 
characteristic of indirect strategy is what Beaufre calls “the freedom of action.” 
Freedom of action is defined as the area set by the potential repercussions upon 
the international situation, “within which the conflict must be kept confined.”73 
Freedom of action can thus be defined as the political area wherein the 
opponents can maneuver, and if that area is crossed, the consequences will 
involve the entry of other actors.  
“Indirect strategy is therefore the art of making the best use of the limited 
area of freedom of action left by the deterrent effect of the existence of nuclear 
weapons and of gaining important and decisive victories in spite of the fact that 
the military resources which can be employed for the purpose must in general 
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remain strictly limited.”74  The concept of indirect strategy is built on two forms of 
maneuver: the exterior and the interior. The aim of the exterior maneuver is to 
create maximum freedom of action, while denying the opponent the same. The 
criterion for success is to create a favorable position on the international level.75 
The actions of the exterior maneuver occur when “primarily psychological; 
political, economic, diplomatic and military measures [are] all combined towards 
the same end.”76 
Beaufre stresses two conditions for success: a military deterrent force to 
“prevent the enemy reacting on a major scale,” and a “definite line of policy,” as 
Beaufre calls “the true operational plan in the psychological field.”77 
The interior maneuver, conducted in the area of operation, is based on 
three interdependent factors: material force, moral force and time. Depending on 
strength of the actor’s factors, Beaufre identifies two methods. The first, “the 
piecemeal method,” uses intermediate objectives by a rapid superior military 
force. The second method, “the erosion method,” is based not on military victory, 
but by prolonging the conflict and making it too costly for the enemy.78 From a 
small state’s perspective, the erosion method seems like a more useful 
approach, and will be further developed in the chapter concerning irregular 
warfare principles.   
Liddell Hart’s focus is foremost on the military strategic and tactical level, 
but he pays attention to grand strategy in one chapter. “A state which expends its 
strength to the point of exhaustion bankrupts its own policy, and future.”79 The 
essence of strategy is to wage a war in accordance with the peace you want to 
achieve.  
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As noted earlier, according to Liddell Hart, states are of two kinds:  the 
acquisitive state and the conservative state. The latter’s most economical 
strategy should not, it seems at first glance, be a purely defensive strategy. 
“Economy of force and deterrent effect are best combined in the defensive-
offensive method, based on high mobility that carries the power of riposte.”80      
Liddell Hart also pays attention to the “camouflaged war,” or guerrilla war, 
offering some strategic principles about the pros and cons of such an approach. 
This will be further elaborated in the chapter concerning irregular warfare.      
Liddell Hart’s main point in the studies of indirect strategy, or the indirect 
approach, is the use of economy of force and psychological blows, thereby 
dislocating the enemy, physically by mobility and psychologically by surprise: 
“When a government appreciates that the enemy has the military superiority, it 
may wisely enjoin a strategy of limited aims,”81 This strategy is based on raiding, 
forcing the enemy to distribute of his forces widely, exhausting moral and 
physical energy.82  
Liddell Hart points out eight axioms as the essence of strategy and tactics: 
“Adjust your ends to your means;” “Keep your object always in mind”; “Choose 
the line of least expectation;” “Exploit the line of least resistance;” “Take a line of 
operation which offers alternative objectives;” “Ensure that both plan and 
disposition are flexible – adopt to circumstances;” “Do not throw your weight into 
a stroke whilst your opponent is on guard;” “Do not renew an attack along the 
same line after it has once failed.” To succeed “two major problems must be 
solved – dislocation and exploitation.”83 According to Liddell Hart, “one precedes 
and one follows the actual blow . . . [You] cannot hit the enemy with effect unless 
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you have first created the opportunity; you cannot make that effect decisive 
unless you exploit the second opportunity that comes before he can recover.”84  
3. Summary 
Based on the questions raised in the beginning of this chapter, the 
analysis has lead to some conclusions concerning a small state’s strategy:  
 Based on a small state´s inferior conventional military capacity, it 
should use an indirect strategy. The end in a conflict for a small state 
will probably not be reached through a direct military victory, but by 
prolonging and spreading the conflict in order to make it too costly for 
the enemy to continue. 
 The indirect strategy must be fought in two spheres: the exterior 
and the interior. The exterior maneuver will aim at gaining freedom of 
action while denying the opponent the same. The means for this 
involves psychological warfare.   
 To avoid exhaustion, the interior maneuver must be fought by the 
use of economy of force and psychological blows, thereby dislocating 
the enemy, physically by mobility, and psychologically by surprise. 
 The military strategy should be a defensive-offensive method, 
based on high mobility that carries the power of riposte.  
 For a small state the desired end state is a return to the pre-conflict 
status quo, with sovereignty within its borders. Thus, a small state 
must make the conflict total, in the sense that the opponent (who often 
sees the war as “limited”) must understand that it is going to be a 
costly war. 
4. How the Weak Win Wars 
In an asymmetric conflict, opposite strategic approaches favor the 
weaker.85 This is the essence of Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s strategic interaction theory. 
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His study covers an analysis of over 200 conflicts between 1816 and 2003. The 
author´s main point is that small states should execute a counterstrategy given 
the other actor’s strategy.86 
According to Arreguín-Toft there are two strategic approaches: direct and 
indirect. While the former targets an adversary’s physical military assets in order 
to destroy the physical capacity to resist, the later approach aims at the will to 
resist.87 Even though the choice of strategy, per se, is primary, Arreguín-Toft 
points at a couple of factors supporting an indirect strategy for the weaker state.    
Interests and vulnerabilities. An actor with very high interests (such as 
survival) in a conflict must be defeated on the battlefield, while an actor with very 
low interests needs not to be defeated military. The higher an actor’s interest in 
the issue at stake, the less vulnerable it will be to being forced to quit a fight 
before a military decision. The lower an actor’s interests, the more vulnerable it 
will be.88 This will lead to a strategic guideline from the political level, i.e., the 
grand strategy, to raise the interest in the conflict and make the conflict total.  
Political vulnerabilities and conflict duration. A war’s duration is a measure 
of its legitimacy, especially in asymmetric wars.89 The Soviet-union war in 
Afghanistan, as well as the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are all examples 
supporting this statement. The wars were initially decided upon by an 
expectation, and from the military side a guarantee, of a quick victory. As the 
conflicts dragged on, the war expenses and own casualties increased, as well as 
civilian suffering and collateral damages reported by media. This lead to a 
political situation for the U.S. government as well as for the Soviet-union regime 
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where the wars and political decisions got questioned internally, by the U.S. and 
Soviet-union home opinion and opposition, as well as internationally.  
This will lead to the conclusion of aiming at prolonging the war, by a 
military indirect strategy and using the exterior maneuver to influence 
international actors and the opponent’s home opposition. Arreguín-Toft argues 
that authoritarian regimes have two advantages over their democratic 
counterparts: control over information that reaches the domestic population; and 
the audience is not in position to alter state policy or strategy.90 From this 
perspective authoritarian states should be less vulnerable politically. This might 
mean that attempts at influencing the home audience of a strong aggressor will 
not be very successful.    
 The Strong actor’s strategic context. Strong actors often have different 
theatres and adversaries to face. Historically, strong actors have favored a direct 
strategy, supported by a conventional military strategy. As a consequence, they 
have generally been unprepared to fight an opponent who uses irregular warfare 
principles.91 The examples of strong actors lacking preparation to fight such an 
asymmetric battle are numerous. One such example is the Soviet attack on 
Finland in 1939, where the Soviets at times (especially in the first part of the war) 
were stopped dead in their tracks by the Finnish Army, which was inferior in 
every way except tactics. Another example is the United States-led coalition in 
the second Iraq War, which after an overwhelming victory against the regular 
Iraqi forces had significant problems adjusting to an emerging insurgent threat. In 
both these examples the strong actors fared better after changing their tactics 
and employing more forces. This does not change the fact that they were initially 
unprepared to fight an enemy who used irregular methods. 
National cohesion and public support. To be successful when on the 
defense, an indirect strategy must be combined with a strong popular support. 
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The weaker state must also have, or gain access to, the physical and political 
sanctuaries necessary to make an indirect strategy a viable choice.92 
In summary, Arreguín-Toft’s work leads to some conclusions for a small 
state’s choice of strategy. First, regarding the use of an indirect strategy, the 
main reason for an indirect strategy is the reality of military asymmetry, where the 
smaller state is inferior.  
Second, smaller states should aim at protracting the conflict/war. If 
strategic surprise or fait accompli were the ideal outcomes for an actor with 
relatively low interests, pre-conflict, the worst outcome would be a protracted 
war. This leads to the conclusion that the attacked actor should protect its forces 
by dispersal, should somehow persevere, and, as a consequence, make the war 
a protracted struggle. This will also lead to the next conclusion.  
Third, a smaller state should make the opponent politically vulnerable. 
From this aspect, Beaufre’s exterior maneuver supports Arreguín-Toft’s theory: 
first by limiting the freedom of action - spreading the conflict and thereby opening 
up a larger front for the adversary to control, and secondly, by prolonging the war 
and thereby increasing the costs politically, economically, and militarily.   
E. THE SMALL STATE’S STRATEGY 
1. The Small State’s Logic  
The most basic objective for a small state’s national military defense 
strategy is to uphold integrity and defend sovereignty. By definition, the aim of 
strategy is to convince an opponent “that it is useless to start or alternatively to 
continue the struggle.”93  
From a small state’s perspective, a crisis where an aggressor challenges 
the smaller state’s integrity and sovereignty can be seen as a logic layer of 
phases. The phases are incidents, aggression, invasion and occupation, and will 
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influence the means of defense; be that means military, political, diplomatic, and / 
or economic. Based on these layers, a defense strategy can be divided into 
different layers of defense actions, and capacities, to uphold integrity and 
sovereignty.  
Incidents are defined as a situation where an opponent violates the state’s 
integrity by air, land or sea.   
Aggressions are defined as an opponent’s operations with the intention to 
influence in order to persuade or deter, and can include taking control of part of a 
country’s territory or other interests. Unlike incidents, aggressions usually have a 
political ingredient.  
Invasion is a subset of aggression, and is defined as an opponent entering 
another country’s territory by military force in order to take control of it, in whole 
or part.  
Occupation is defined as a situation where an aggressor has taken control 
of the territory in whole, or in part. According to U.S. Department of Defense, 
occupation is “a condition in which territory is under the effective control of a 
foreign armed force.”94 “A Territory is considered occupied when it is actually 
placed under the authority of the hostile army . . . The occupation applies only to 
the territory where such authority is established, and in a position to assert 
itself.”95 
Whether the layers will be in a logical order or not, depends on the 
aggressor’s motives, objectives, and strategy, and the development of the crises, 
i.e., the small state’s counteractions and the international response. There are, of 
course, different scenarios, depending on the aggressor’s objectives, chosen 
strategy, relative resources and calculated freedom of action. (The strategy can 
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consist of conventional operations, terrorism, limited attacks, surprise attacks, 
etc., depending on the purpose). However, in general these are the layers that 
must be taken into account when constructing a strategy to defend the country. 
Beaufre explains the bottom-line in this reasoning by classifying strategic 
plans into different patterns based on “the relative resources available to the 
opposing sides and the importance of the issue at stake.”96 In summary, there 
will be a need for a flexible military response, and a convincing strategy that in 
the first place will be a deterrent, and in the second place will inflict enough costs 
onto an aggressor to end hostilities.  
Based on the layers, three “strategic actions” appear: deterrence, in order 
to persuade an opponent through the anticipated costs of any actions threatening 
integrity and sovereignty; Defense, either limited or total, first in order to respond 
to incidents, and later on to handle aggressions and invasion; and finally, during 
occupation, resistance. All strategic actions have a common goal: defend and/or 
restore integrity and sovereignty.  
If choosing a conventional, direct strategy, aiming to destroy the 
opponent’s capacity to continue, where can we find the threshold where the 
stronger aggressive state will win?  An invasion is quite straightforward in logical 
thinking, and will end with an occupation, if that is the conventionally superior 
state´s objective. The interesting finding in this argument is that, based on a 
conventional military reasoning, the threshold is to be found in the second layer, 
the aggression. During this phase an aggressor could choose to interrupt or 
continue. As long as there are no incentives to abort, a further escalation would 
benefit the aggressor. The escalation will benefit the aggressor having a military 
conventional advantage: he knows the outcome if escalation occurs, and he 
knows that he will win. A small state, with a conventional military strategy, has no 
real choice, as he is out of military options. The weaker is dragged into a 
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conventional “cul-de-sac.” In summary, there seems not to be any logical 
reasons to fight a war you clearly cannot win. 
So, if military strategy is about achieving the ends set by political policy, 
the first challenge for small states is that they do not possess the resources 
(means) to use a direct strategy, i.e., a strategy to deter and impose their will on 
an opponent by conventional military means. This leads to the use of an indirect 
strategy, seeking a decisive situation in other ways, and avoiding a decisive 
military battle against a militarily superior enemy.   
2. Summary: The Small State’s Ends, Ways and Means  
If “The art of strategy consists in choosing the most suitable means 
available” and combining them “to produce a psychological pressure sufficient to 
achieve the moral effect required,” how is this executed by a small state?97 
First, military means cannot be seen in isolation, but must be combined 
with the other means available to the small state. The importance of a grand 
strategy and statecraft is paramount for the small state. The ability to maneuver 
on the exterior, as Beaufre puts it, in order to gain freedom of action, while 
denying the same for the opponent, is critical. This maneuver will include all 
kinds of tricks, and the use of all the state´s tools (diplomacy, informational, 
military, and economics), aimed at spreading the conflict into the international 
arena and context, and, thereby, producing the psychological pressure required 
for an aggressor to reconsider his plans.  
Second, from a military perspective, if the art of military strategy is 
“applying force so that it makes the most effective contribution towards achieving 
the ends set by political policy,” where is the effectiveness?98 For a small state 
confronted by a militarily superior opponent, the odds are low if captured in a 
conventional conflict. Here the military counterstrategy will be executed.  
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The basic role for the defense strategy is to deter. If deterrence fails, the 
interior maneuver will be based on a military indirect strategy, with the aim not to 
win by purely military means, but by psychological blows supported by carefully 
employed kinetic activity. This strategy will focus on avoiding exhaustion by the 
use of high mobility, surprise, dispersal and concentration, thereby prolonging the 
conflict, and exhausting the enemy. The aim is the same as in the exterior 
maneuver: psychologically and physically exhausting the enemy, making him 
understand that he is better off with ending his aggression because the costs will 
exceed the benefits. 
In summary, the end for a small state’s strategy is to defend integrity and 
sovereignty. The way is to use an indirect strategy with the military means based 
on irregular warfare principles, executed with tactics that support the strategy, 





III. IRREGULAR WARFARE PRINCIPLES 
Based on the previous chapters concerning strategy, it seems evident that 
a small state should develop an indirect strategy, avoiding open confrontation 
with a larger opponent’s military forces, while making any attack by an aggressor 
more costly than the aggressor is willing to pay. The costs in this case are 
foremost political, military and/or economic. This premise leads away from 
conventional military thinking and solutions, and leads to another approach: 
irregular warfare.  
According to Arreguín-Toft’s How the Weak Win Wars, there is a trend 
towards small states winning more conflicts over greater states.99 The interesting 
thing here is not the fact that this is happening, but rather how it is happening. 
There are two answers to this question. The first is that it is a result of the choice 
of strategy. As discussed in earlier chapter, a small state should adapt a strategy 
that leads to specific ends, the state’s integrity and sovereignty. The use of an 
indirect strategy is the obvious choice, based on the idea that the smaller state is 
militarily inferior and, thereby, cannot win a conventional military conflict. The 
second answer is that it is a result of the use of irregular warfare principles. This 
chapter will identify the principles and the factors for a successful irregular 
warfare approach, using the theories of Beaufre, Liddell Hart, Mao Tse-Tung and 
Clausewitz, and historical case studies based on Sandor Fabian’s research in 
Professional Irregular Defense Forces: the Other Side of the COIN. 
A. WHAT IS IRREGULAR WARFARE? 
It is hard to find an exact definition of irregular warfare. According to 
Unites States Joint Forces Command´s 2006 irregular warfare special study,  
IW is used loosely as a synonym for unconventional warfare, 
asymmetric warfare, guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, 
nontraditional warfare, low intensity conflict, insurgency, rebellion, 
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revolt, civil war, insurrection, revolutionary warfare, internal war, 
counter insurgency, subversive war, war within a population, 
intrastate war, internal development, internal security, internal 
defense, stability, law and order, nation building, state building, 
small war, peacemaking, peacekeeping, fourth generation warfare 
(4GW), and global war on terror (GWOT).100  
The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff define irregular warfare as “[a] 
violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence 
over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric 
approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, 
in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”101  
Arreguín-Toft defines Guerrilla Warfare Strategy (GWS) as, 
… the organization of a portion of a society for the purpose of 
imposing costs on an adversary using armed forces trained to avoid 
direct confrontations. These costs include the loss of soldiers, 
supplies, infrastructure, peace of mind and, most important, time. 
Although GWS primarily targets opposing armed forces and their 
support resources, its goal is to destroy not the capacity but the will 
of the attacker.102 
According to Mao Tse-Tung, guerrilla warfare is the “weapon that a nation 
inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful 
aggressor nation.”103   
By comparison, the United States Marine Corps refers to irregular warfare 
as, 
… all unconventional methods of violence used to counter the 
traditional capabilities of a nation-state’s military forces. Examples 
of irregular war include acts that are military, political, 
psychological, and economic in nature, conducted to undermine the 
                                            
100 United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, “Irregular Warfare 
Special Study” (Suffolk, VA: 2006), pp. II–3 Accessed October 11, 2013, 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/133062142/Irregular-Warfare-Special-Study-2006. 
101 Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.07 December 1, 2008, 11. Accessed 
October 9, 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf. 
102 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 32–33.  
103 Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 42.   
 39 
authority of a local government or influence an external power. This 
category includes insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists, and similar 
groups and organizations, which operate in weak and/or failing 
nation-states.104 
James D. Kiras focuses on groups and their (lack of) resources in his 
definition of irregular warfare: “the use of violence by sub-state actor or groups 
within states for political purposes of achieving power, control, and legitimacy, 
using unorthodox or unconventional approaches to warfare owing to a 
fundamental weakness in resources or capabilities.”105 
The aim is, like the aims with strategy, to win the war by other means than 
a direct confrontation, or as Mao Tse-Tung puts it, “to preserve oneself and 
destroy the enemy.”106 From this perspective irregular warfare is the method, or 
military means, to fulfill the ends stated by policy.  
In summary, irregular warfare has a broad definition including a gamut of 
“warfare methods,” as described above. The most important parts include the 
aim to “erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will,”107 and to preserve 
oneself by avoiding direct conventional confrontations. IW can be seen as a 
different military mindset, using other methods than conventional warfare to 
exhaust and erode the will of the opponent. The opponent from this perspective 
is made up of the aggressor´s policy makers, the military and the domestic 
population.  
This thesis will define irregular warfare as the overarching method used in 
an indirect strategy in order to win the war by other means than conventional 
warfare. This definition leaves open to a wide range of tactics for the small state 
to use, from classical guerrilla tactics, commando-style raiding, to terrorist and 
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resistance tactics (sabotage, assassinations, etc.) and non-violent actions, 
depending on the state’s resources. The aim is to erode the will of the opponent 
to start or continue a conflict.   
B. DECISIVE PRINCIPLES AND FACTORS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 
What are the principles and factors that promote success for irregular 
warfare? The question will be approached by first analyzing military theories and 
subsequently by analyzing historic cases. 
1. In Theory – Beaufre 
In situations where a state is militarily inferior, Beaufre refers to the 
erosion model. Operations conducted by this model must emphasis “two spheres 
at the same time, the material sphere, i.e., that of military force, and the morale 
sphere, i.e., that of psychological action”108  
In the material sphere, the priority is to persevere by using guerilla actions. 
The military operation should be based on “refusing battle and using harassing 
tactics to keep the conflict going.”109 Beaufre refers to Mao Tse-Tung’s seven 
principles for success, and adds two essential concepts to maintain freedom of 
action. The first is the use of terrorism in order to deter the population from 
supporting the enemy. The second concept is to “extend the guerrilla threat over 
the widest possible area” in order to create increased security problems and 
“redress the balance of forces.”110 
In the psychological sphere, priority is also to endure, mentally and in 
terms of morale. Beaufre stresses the importance of coordinating psychological 
actions and guerrilla actions in order to raise one’s own morale and at the same 
time erode the enemy, by “drawing the maximum advantage from any success 
achieved.” At the same time the coordination of the exterior and interior 
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maneuvers is essential.111 What Beaufre is describing is the use of psychological 
warfare as an essential part in irregular warfare. The objectives are to increase 
one’s own morale while decreasing the opponent’s morale, winning the battle of 
the narrative, and thereby international support.    
2. In Theory – Liddell Hart 
In his reflections on guerrilla war, Liddell Hart points out some principles. 
First, he sees the need to be dynamic and maintain momentum. “Static defense 
has no part in guerrilla actions, “ and  “will allow the opponent to tighten his grip 
of the country and give rest to his troops…”112 
Second, he stresses that “[G]uerrilla action reverses the normal practice of 
warfare, strategically by seeking to avoid battle and tactically by evading any 
engagement where it is likely to suffer losses.”113 The term Liddell Hart uses as 
the tactical principle is “hit and run,” based on the notion that “minor coups and 
threats can have a greater effect in tipping the scales… by producing more 
cumulative distraction, disturbance, and demoralization among the enemy.”114   
Third, dispersion and fluidity of force are two factors necessary, in order 
to, in the first place survive and avoid being a target, and in the second place, be 
able to concentrate forces when conducting operations.115 
Fourth, the terrain plays a critical role in two ways, according to Liddell 
Hart: first as a factor of “the ratio of space to forces.” This is based on the need 
for an opponent to control areas. Liddell Hart favors rugged and forest country, 
and sees urban areas as a “good ground for a subversive campaign.” The 
second role of terrain involves the necessity of superior local knowledge.116 This 
implies the need for local recruitment, or local support. 
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Finally, the author highlights the attitude of the people. According to 
Liddell Hart, “guerrilla war is waged by the few but dependent on the support of 
the many.” A guerrilla war can only be effective when collectively backed by the 
population. According to Liddell Hart the guerrilla “tends to be most effective if it 
blends an appeal to national resistance or desire for independence with an 
appeal to a socially and economically discontent population”117 To the extension, 
by gaining popular support the guerilla can increase support in the form of 
intelligence and supplies, while denying the enemy the same.118 
3. In Theory – Mao Tse-Tung 
In using Mao Tse-Tung’s On Guerrilla Warfare as a reference, it is 
important to stress the contemporary context of his theories and writings. First, 
Mao was striving to win a struggle for political control and organization of the 
state, China. Second, he was facing a war with Japan. This means that his 
purpose involved something other than establishing a defense of a nation. Still, 
his writings have relevance for an analysis of IW theory. 
In summary, Mao Tse-Tung’s On Guerrilla Warfare (Yu Chi Chan) leads to 
certain distinctive characteristics for a successful guerrilla war:  
The relationship between guerrilla warfare and national policy. 
According to Mao, guerrilla warfare must be organized and conducted in 
accordance with the national policy and create a national “anti-aggressor” front. 
To realize the policy, Mao points at certain steps: “Arousing and organizing the 
population,” “Achieving internal unification politically,” “Establishing bases,” 
“Equipping forces,” “Recovering national strength,” “Destroying the enemy’s 
national strength,” and “Regaining lost territories.”119 A vital conclusion from 
these steps is that in order to increase the expectation of survival and growth in 
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the first phase, a nation needs to organize and train its military forces in 
peacetime and thereby secure the first four steps above. 
Mao further stresses the need “to realize the relationship that exists 
between politics and military affairs…” and “while military affairs and political 
affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from another.”120 This 
implies coordination between the political and military level, as well as with 
educated officers.  
The relation to the population. Mao stresses the need for population 
support from two perspectives. The first is the political perspective, that guerrilla 
warfare will fail “if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the 
people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained.”121 
The second perspective is based on the fact that “guerrilla warfare derives from 
the masses and is supported by them.” Therefore, guerrilla warfare “can neither 
exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation.”122  
Leadership and Organization. The basis for a military organization is a 
political and military leadership. This is, according to Mao, “true regardless the 
source or size of such unit.”123 Mao also stresses the need for educated, 
disciplined leaders in order to organize and conduct guerrilla warfare.124 In 
comparison to orthodox warfare, where command is centralized, in guerrilla 
warfare decentralization and independence play a principal role.125    
Guerrilla Strategy. Mao states “Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily 
on alertness, mobility and attack.”126 It should further take into account “the 
enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative 
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strengths, the weather, and the situation of the population.”127 In this context, 
Mao also stresses the strategy to turn the country’s advantages to the purpose of 
resisting and defeating the enemy. These advantages are to be found in the 
country’s terrain, climate, and society in general.128 
The conduct of guerilla warfare is further explained by guidelines based on 
surprise, high mobility to attack and withdraw, harass and create local superiority 
to win local battles. “In guerrilla strategy, the enemy’s rear, flanks, and other 
vulnerable points are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, 
dispersed, exhausted and annihilated.”129  This strategy (and tactic) can be 
compared to John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s principles of swarming.130  
The quality of internal purity. “When a nation is invaded, the people 
become sympathetic to one another and all aid in organizing guerrilla units…”131 
Mao makes a vital point here: Common efforts to a common enemy. At the same 
time, he points out the risks that might occur based on internal political 
differences that create defectors, subunits, criminality, i.e., people and groups 
exploiting the situation. Propaganda, and a functional security apparatus are vital 
to suppress these fractures.      
4. In Theory – Carl von Clausewitz 
Clausewitz addresses what he calls the People’s war in On War.132 From 
his perspective, guerrilla warfare is generally seen “either as a last resort after a 
defeat or as a natural auxiliary before a decisive battle.”133  
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He identifies five conditions where a people’s war alone can become 
effective: The war must be fought in the interior of the country; it must not be 
decided by a single stroke; the theatre of must be fairly large; the national 
character must be suited to that type of war; and the country must be rough and 
inaccessible, because of mountains, forests, marshes, or the local methods of 
cultivation.134  
In summary, Clausewitz points out the following decisive characteristics: 
Swarming Tactics. Clausewitz considers guerrilla warfare  
… to be nebulous and elusive; its resistance should never 
materialize as a concrete body, otherwise the enemy can direct 
sufficient force at its core, crush it, and take many prisoners. . . . On 
the other hand, there must be some concentration at certain points: 
the fog must thicken and form a dark and menacing cloud out of 
which a bolt of lightning may strike at any time.135  
He also addresses the difference between strategic and tactical defense, 
and the importance of avoiding tactical defense by scattering if attacked and 
continuing the resistance by surprise attacks. The bottom line in Clausewitz’s 
discussion about guerrilla tactics can also be seen as related to the concept of 
swarming.136  
The national character Clausewitz highlights the will to continue the fight, 
even if the conditions are disadvantageous and the situation seems hopeless. 
“Even after a defeat, there is always the possibility that a turn of fortune can be 
brought about by developing new sources of internal strength…” He continues, 
“[N]o matter how small and weak a state may be in comparison with its enemy, it 
must not forego these last efforts, or one would conclude that its soul is dead.”137       
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Advantageous terrain. Even though Clausewitz do not elaborate further 
on this characteristic, a tactically sound use of the local terrain is vital to regain 
the initiative, once invaded.138   
5. In Practice – A Summary of Fabian’s Case Study 
Sandor Fabian has made an extensive research of six different conflicts 
where irregular warfare was used.139 In summary the principles and factors used, 
and in some cases disregarded, are identified as follows:  
National cohesion. The ability of a state to gather all national strength 
and will for a common end, both physical and psychological, is vital in order to 
succeed in a conflict using irregular warfare.  
This was the case in the American Revolutionary war, with the objective of 
independence and national identity; in the first Russo-Chechen War 1994–96, 
when Dudayev succeeded in creating a united national will; and in the Second 
Lebanese War 2006.140  
This was not the case in the Boer War, where the Boers had a hard time 
maintaining strategic unity and, as a result, suffered ultimate defeat – although by 
a very narrow margin – by the British.141  
This factor of national cohesion is supported by Mao, who referred to this 
as “The quality of internal purity” and Clausewitz who noted that “the national 
character must be suited to that [Guerrilla] type of war.” Beaufre identifies this 
factor as “the moral force” and “a definite line of policy,” while Arreguin-Toft calls 
it “nationalistic.”142 
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Popular Support. A second factor identified is popular support. Generally, 
in all of Fabian’s case studies, popular support turned out to be a decisive factor, 
supporting irregular warfare politically as well as tactically. 
The need for popular support is supported by Mao, recalling this as “The 
relation to the population,”143 as well as by Liddell Hart applying the term “the 
attitude of the people.”144 
Intelligence and information advantages. All case studies in Sandor 
Fabian’s thesis emphasize the advantages of intelligence and information as a 
decisive factor. The advantages were established due to two factors: first by the 
support of the local population, and second by tactics (mobility, reconnaissance) 
in combination with knowledge of the local terrain.  
In the case of Yugoslavia, Tito even had an established observation and 
spying system, with agents throughout the country and amongst the German 
occupiers.145 
For the Chechen rebels, the knowledge of the enemy’s tactics and 
techniques, and of weaknesses in the Soviet weapons systems was a significant 
factor that lead to well-prepared operations.146 The Chechens were also 
supported by a “civilian-population based, human-intelligence network… 
providing accurate and timely information for the rebels about Russian locations 
and movements.”147 
Hezbollah`s advantages could be found in three areas. First, “…an 
extensive knowledge on Israeli military doctrine…” Second, the use of deception, 
in order to mislead Israeli intelligence (aerial and human platforms), “through 
‘turned’ agents, concealing its positions and using many dummy bunkers…”  and 
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third, through information  security, that “denied the Israelis access to key 
information during the conflict.”148 
Keep the struggle alive – time. This factor is only explicitly mentioned in 
the Russo-Chechen war, where the Chechen strategy was, after an initial 
drawback of losses, to keep the struggle alive. This was explained by one of the 
Chechen commanders: “There is no winning. We know that. If we are fighting, we 
are winning. If we are not, we have lost. The Russians can kill us and destroy this 
land. Then they will win. But we will make it very painful for them.”149 
This factor is only mentioned by Beaufre in his erosion model. At the same 
time, all the theorists mention the psychological aspect of irregular warfare, and 
the aim to destroy the will. An indirect strategy, based on irregular warfare and 
avoiding direct confrontation, will lead to a need to keep the struggle alive in 
order to not lose. The reason is twofold: first to exhaust the enemy; second to 
deny the opponent freedom of action by gaining international support and making 
the war too costly for the opponent, both internationally and domestically. 
Organization. An organization must fit given prerequisites concerning 
resources, the environment, and chosen strategy and tactics. In general, in all 
the conflicts studied by Fabian the weaker party adapted to this prerequisite, and 
it would also turn out to be an important factor in supporting the choice of an 
indirect strategy and irregular tactics.  
In the American Revolutionary War the existing militia system, with its 
mandatory military training, provided an initial force for the colonies.150 “Later, the 
same militia, whose organization, training, and tactics were more suited for 
guerrilla war than conventional battles, provided a great foundation for the 
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introduction of an irregular strategy.”151 The organization also adapted to the 
circumstances, and “Marion and Sumter’s forces remained fluid and flexible 
during the entire war.”152 
The South African commandos took the conventionally organized and 
trained forces and turned them into an irregular force after their conventional 
efforts were defeated. According to Fabian, “The divided units and their 
maneuvers allowed the Boers to “achieve local superiority long enough to 
escape…” and the self-sufficient elements of these small units could “break into 
many small groups and travel separately to a new rally point…”153 
The flexibility and fluidity of forces was also prominent in the war in 
German East Africa. Based on a conventional force, the Germans adapted both 
organization and tactics to meet the requirement.154 
In this case of The Yugoslav partisans, “the country began the war with an 
already existing, conventionally organized, trained, and equipped army, which 
surrendered after eleven days.” However, “after the country’s complete defeat 
and occupation, a previously existing (but not military) organization, already 
operating underground, took over the mission to fight against the invaders.”155 
The Chechen forces created a decentralized network-type organization, 
and combined the organization with “combined arms” at the small unit level. This 
organization proved to be highly effective and a key in their use of a swarming-
based irregular strategy.156 
According to Anthony H. Cordesman’s Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-
Hezbollah War, “Hezbollah further organized its fighters into small, self-sufficient 
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teams capable of operating independently and without direction from high 
authority for long periods of time.”157 This organization “minimized their footprint 
and appearance time,” avoiding the advantages of the Israeli precision-weapon 
systems, “while providing maximum operational effectiveness.”158 
In summary, by building the military organization on small independent 
units, with delegated authority and the ability to coordinate, the smaller actors 
were able to execute their chosen strategy military tactics. The successful actors 
based their organizations and tactics on knowledge gained from traditional 
military service, combined with a creativity forced on them by necessity. In the 
most successful cases, the irregular organizations were also established and 
trained before hostilities erupted. “Trustful security strategies and competent 
defense forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.”159 
Psychological warfare (Information warfare). Fabian’s research also 
points out psychological warfare (PSYWAR) as a common factor for success. 
PSYWAR is, according to William E. Daugherty, defined as “…the planned use of 
propaganda and other actions designed to influence the opinions, attitudes and 
behavior of enemy, neutral, and friendly foreign groups in such way as to support 
the accomplishment of national aims and objectives.”160 To further clarify 
PSYWAR, propaganda has to be defined. This paper will use Stillwell’s definition 
for propaganda: “the planned use of any form of communication designed to 
affect the minds, emotions, and actions of a given group for a specific 
purpose”161  
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The expression “other actions,” used by Daugherty, and the expression 
“any form of communication,” need further explanation. Ron Schleifer highlights 
this by identifying other actions as non-violence actions (NVA), subversion, 
terrorism, and insurgency.162 
According to Fabian, the Boers used propaganda to their advantage on 
the tactical level as well at the strategic level, in order to get international support 
and undermine the British political and military strategy. However, he adds, “The 
Boers failed not just in convincing the British voters about their cause, but in 
gaining significant outside support from other countries.”163 This might be a 
rather simplified version of what happened. Arquilla describes the lack of effect 
more as an effect of British realpolitik:  
Emily Hobhouse of Britain . . . brought British and world attention 
not only to the squalid conditions of the camps but to the atrocities 
committed by imperial troops against Boer civilians. She 
interviewed many women in the camps, recording their eyewitness 
accounts of murder and rape. These revelations led to a firestorm 
of public criticism, increasing pressure on the government to rein in 
Kitchener. But the fact that his methods seemed to be working 
against the guerrillas made Whitehall slow to act.164 
Tito did support his tactics with propaganda operations “ . . . which had 
three main goals: undermining the invaders’ morale, informing the population 
about the existence of the resistance, and increasing the self-confidence and 
morale of the partisans.”165 
In the case of the Russo-Chechen war, the Chechens used PSYWAR in 
order to  
… break the Russian leadership’s will to fight and to force the 
withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechen territory… [C]hechens 
also introduced psychological operations supported by terrorism as 
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another form of their irregular approach.”166 “The Chechens 
[further] influenced public opinion by allowing a large number of 
international journalists to be present in Grozny and other hot 
spots…167 
Similarly,  
Hezbollah properly recognized the military value of the media and 
entered the war with an already functioning system. Through its 
own television station, its website, and the use of embedded 
reporters, Hezbollah retained its ability during the entire conflict to 
formulate and communicate its agenda to the proper target 
audiences, which had a significant impact on the end results of the 
conflict.168 
As showed, PSYWAR is a vital factor in irregular warfare. This is based on 
the importance of producing a psychological pressure or blow to the enemy by 
influencing his will. Beaufre highlights this foremost in the exterior maneuver to 
decrease the opponent’s freedom of action. Arreguín-Toft highlights the need to 
make the opponent politically vulnerable. Liddell Hart talks about demoralization. 
Mao stresses the need of “political activities” in order to unify the own army and 
the population, and to destruct the unity of the enemy.169   
Leadership. A common factor in Fabian´s research is the salient traits of 
the commanders. General Greene is described as a man who had the ability to 
understand the situation, as well as think unconventionally, and to use this faculty 
to “adapt to the situation and exploit the possibilities.”170  
The Boer leaders De Wet and Smuts are both described as strategists 
and warriors, able to understand and adapt to the situation, who led by 
example.171 Paul Von Lettow-Vorbeck was a strategist and fighter, operationally 
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experienced, with flexibility and ability to tailor the operations and organization 
depending the situation.172  
Tito is described by Walter Laqueur, as “a great political and military 
leader, imperturbable, a man of iron will, a true believer yet not a fanatic.”173 At 
the same time he had operational experience from World War I, as well as in 
leading and organizing the secret communist network in Yugoslavia.174  
Aslan Maskhadov, with years of experience in the Soviet Army and, 
thereby, intimate knowledge of his enemy, had a “considerable aptitude for 
irregular military operations.”175 According to Fabian “His vision of commander’s-
intent-based operations, which relied on highly decentralized execution and 
small-unit level coordination, proved to be very effective not only during this initial 
conflict, but throughout the entire war against the Russians.”176 
But however brilliant the leaders of military force are, their ideas must be 
fostered in the whole organization, especially in irregular warfare. Subordinate, 
small-unit leaders must be capable of taking local initiative and independent 
actions, working along the broad strategic goals and overall lines of operation.  
The common qualities for the leaders in Fabian’s study can be 
summarized as possessing a strategic vein, understanding the overall situation 
and adapting accordingly by applying unconventional thinking and solutions. 
Meanwhile there is a “warrior” vein, built on experience, that leads to an 
understanding of the tactical level, and thereby a willingness to trust and 
delegate authority to subordinate leaders who have the “ground truth.”    
Mao and Liddell Hart support the importance of leadership. Mao stresses 
the qualities of endurance, mixing with the people (social competence), and 
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education.177 Liddell Hart makes an interesting note about military training and 
the lack of taking the psychology into account. This lack fosters “a cult of 
soundness rather than surprise (and) breeds commanders who are so intent not 
to do anything wrong…that they forget the necessity of making the enemy do 
something wrong.”178 Such an approach is not appropriate for an irregular 
organization. 
Tactical principles. In all cases studied, a common feature is the tactics 
used. Tactical factors such as swarming, employing mobility in order to disperse 
and concentrate, having local knowledge of terrain and weather, were all keys to 
tactical success. These features will be further developed in Chapter IV. 
C. IRREGULAR WARFARE – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 
The intention of this chapter is to identify the principles and the factors for 
a successful irregular warfare approach, based on both theory and case studies.  
Based on the questions raised in this chapter, the analysis leads to some 
conclusions for a successful use of irregular warfare for a small state. The most 
prominent factors are summarized as follows.  
First, there is a need of national cohesion. As stated earlier in this chapter, 
the ability to gather all national strengths, both physical and psychological, and 
hold on for a common end is vital to success in a conflict using irregular warfare.  
With national cohesion comes popular support. Popular support is a 
strategic matter of a joint venture to support the national efforts and political 
decisions. It is also a matter of supporting a nation’s own forces to create 
intelligence and information advantages, as well as support with logistics, safe 
havens, local knowledge etc., while denying the enemy the same.   
Second, as stated by Beaufre in his erosion model, the conflict will be 
fought in two dimensions: the physical and the psychological. In combination with 
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Beaufre’s concept for indirect strategy, strategic coordination will be vital for an 
effective use of the state’s resources, coordination of psychological warfare and 
gaining international support.  
Third, based on the tactical and strategic principles identified, 
decentralization is paramount. Decentralization, and “auftragstaktik” requires 
professional leaders, as well as trust between the strategic, operational and 
tactical levels of command. The basis for these requirements must be built before 
the conflict erupts. 
Fourth, according to Samuel B. Griffith II, “historical experience suggests 
that there is very little hope of destroying a [revolutionary] guerrilla movement 
after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of 
a significant segment of the population.”179 This, in combination with the 
opportunity to conduct war planning and preparations, implies that the 
organization should be established in peacetime in order to gain a quick 
response to an aggressor threatening the state’s integrity and sovereignty.  
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IV. APPLICATION OF STRATEGY 
Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and earth, 
unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and the moon, they end 





Float like a butterfly, 





A. TACTICS, ORGANIZATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 
In the previous sections, it has been shown that a small state has the best 
chances for maintaining its sovereignty and freedom by employing an indirect 
military strategy and by using principles of irregular warfare. There is, however, a 
significant span from the overarching national strategy to the practical 
application: the actual fighting. Oftentimes, this span is so long that it can be hard 
to find a common thread, or theme, that can be followed through all elements of 
the military organization. This means that the chosen strategy – if it is at all 
clearly defined – is not necessarily reflected at the practical levels of the military 
organization. Sometimes, strategy is even dictated by what can be achieved by 
the tactics or the organization that a country happens to have. For a small 
country, with limited resources, such deficiencies can lead to disastrous results. 
While a larger state can sometimes (but not always) get away with less-than-
optimal solutions just because of its sheer military mass, which is not the case for 
the small state. 
This means there has to be a continuous line of thought through the whole 
defense system, where the tasks and capabilities that the organization produces 
are clearly linked to the overall chosen strategy.   





The elements should be considered in this order, as each shapes the one 
below it, and supports the one above. Strategy tells the military What to do – the 
overall goals. The tactics must be chosen as ways to achieve these goals – or 
How to do it. The organization must be designed so that everyone knows Who is 
doing what with clearly assigned tasks. In order to do this, the tasks must be 
defined first. Starting with an organization and then defining what it should do, or 
produce, is clearly not a good idea. Still, this has been done, and is probably still 
being done, in military organizations around the world. When the goals are 
defined, and tasks have been defined and distributed, it is time to look at the 
Tools with which the tasks are solved. The tools – or technology (or equipment) – 
come last in this chain for two reasons: the first reason, as stated above, is linked 
to the tasks; there is little reason to have equipment without a task. This view 
does not prohibit contingency planning, it just means that there has to be a 
logically derived, and holistic plan, supporting any acquisition process. In the 
same way, it is problematic to have a task for which you do not have relevant 
equipment to help you execute it. The second reason is that personnel are more 
important than equipment. The human, as part of the organization, should be 
equipped, not the other way around. In a small organization, the optimal 
performance of each individual is even more important.  
Having stated the logic upon which the analysis will build, it is time to 




1. Defining Tactics 
The U.S. Department of Defense definition of tactics is “The employment 
and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.”180 In other words, it 
is the description of how you use the forces you have available in order to 
achieve the goals that have been given to you. This means there is – or at least 
should be – a clear connection between strategy, tactics, and organization. This 
connection goes both ways. In their 2009 study “Distributed Manoeuver: 21st 
Century Offensive Tactics,” authors Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan state that 
“Although tactics must serve strategy, strategic ambitions are necessarily subject 
to tactical possibilities, and the interplay between ends and means is a two-way 
conversation between the abstract and the physical.”181 The authors further state 
that “Strategy without tactics is words without actions, and tactics without 
strategy is senseless violence.”182  
Based on the above descriptions, it can be concluded that when 
establishing or changing a military organization, it is important that the strategy is 
seen as the basis for the tactics. 
The following description of tactics for a military organization is not an 
attempt at a complete textbook covering all aspects of tactics. Different 
organizations have different tasks and operating environments, and will need to 
develop their specific tactics accordingly. Therefore, what follows is rather a 
general analysis of tactical principles for irregular warfare, derived logically, and 
historically tested. 
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2. Strategic Defense Does Not Preclude a Tactically Offensive 
Mindset 
Referencing the analyses made in the previous chapters, this thesis is 
meant to describe an alternative approach for the defense forces of small 
nations. The authors presume that most small nations´ primary interest is in the 
protection of the integrity of their own territories. This means that the following 
descriptions are primarily directed at defensive activities – meaning defensive at 
the national strategic level. It is not aimed at describing the best practices for a 
military force intent upon invading other nations´ territories. This does not mean 
that such forces shall not conduct tactically offensive operations. Quite to the 
contrary, the essence of the tactics of the irregular forces will involve 
aggressively executed attacks on vulnerable parts of the enemy structure or 
organization, wherever and whenever possible and appropriate. Although the 
defending forces may choose certain suitable areas to stop an enemy, there is 
nothing static in an irregular strategic defense. Holding territory for territory´s 
sake has no value. To quote General Patton, from his speech to the Third Army 
before the Allied invasion of France in 1944: “We are not holding a goddamned 
thing. Let the Germans do that. We are advancing constantly, and we are not 
interested in holding onto anything except the enemies´ balls.”183 
3. Tactical Principles 
Achieving success for a military organization is – as many other aspects of 
life—easy in theory. In order to win, you need to avoid sustaining significant 
damage while inflicting enough damage to the opponent. For the smaller party of 
an asymmetric conflict, this also holds true, but avoiding damage and eventually 
destruction is even more important, since a small military organization can only 
sustain small losses before it begins to lose effect. When facing a more powerful 
opponent, the key to avoiding damage is avoiding detection. In the Australian 
2009 study “Distributed Manoeuver: 21st Century Offensive Tactics,” the concept 
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of a “detection threshold” is described. This threshold is defined as the maximum 
size a military element can have before it is detected. The authors refer to 
“granularity . . . reliably achievable by technological wide area surveillance 
assets”184 as the key to how high this threshold is.185 It is only logical to see the 
“detection threshold” not only as a function of technology, but also as a function 
of terrain, weather, skills, and technological countermeasures employed by the 
elements trying to avoid detection.  
Regardless of how a detection threshold is defined, adhering to the 
concept is key to survival. If an element can be seen, it can be targeted. In the 
historical examples upon which this thesis is based, staying undetected when 
needed was critical in all cases. To that end, in all the cases, staying below the 
detection threshold was achieved by keeping elements small (especially when on 
the move) and using the terrain in conjunction with camouflage. The Boers used 
clothing in colors that blended in with the natural colors of the terrain, while 
employing natural vegetation to hide their firing positions. The Finnish soldiers in 
the Winter War used white camouflage suits in order to avoid detection in the 
snow-covered terrain. “A good man could wrap his snowsuit around him and 
hunker down in such a way as to be invisible to a Russian patrol passing ten 
meters away.”186 More than fifty years later, the Chechen fighters used the same 
principles of camouflage by building hidden firing positions deep in buildings, so 
that the Russians had a hard time returning aimed fire. In all cases, the IW 
elements kept their fighting elements small enough to avoid detection.  
The technology related to detection does not only cover surveillance in the 
visual spectrum. Transmission of signals from communication devices is a vital 
indicator of activity. The higher the technological level of an adversary, the higher 
is the threat of them having a well-developed electronic warfare capability. This 
technological threat is also related to the way the IW organization must operate. 
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The individual elements must be able to operate without continually transmitting 
in the electromagnetic spectrum. They must stay below the detection threshold 
also in this dimension. That will have bearing on how they operate, including 
command and control, which will be covered later in this chapter. 
This leads to the first tactical principle: Avoid detection by staying below 
the detection threshold. 
The element of unit size, as related to the detection threshold, needs 
further discussion. As has been discussed above, the detection threshold is not 
an absolute value, but will change depending on factors such as enemy 
surveillance technology and terrain. Since the detection threshold is likely to 
change, so must the size of the elements of the organization. Since there is a link 
between size, combat power, and sustainability, it is not as simple as just 
shrinking the element size to a minimum. The elements must be able to not only 
survive, but also thrive in the field for long periods of time. They must be able to 
inflict damage to the enemy, and they must be able to defend themselves, as 
well as treat damages or injuries. This is one of the reasons why conventional 
units tend to be so large. For the irregulars, the correct solution for size is found 
at the balancing point. The guiding principle for size is to, Be as small as needed 
in order to avoid detection, and as large as needed in order to achieve combat 
effectiveness. While this is a vague and general description, it must be in order to 
cover all potential situations. The optimal size depends on the situation and 
tasks. Suggested standardized elements will be described in the Organization 
chapter.   
As can be gathered from the above discussion, size should not be static. 
A force employing IW principles should be able to disperse and concentrate as 
the situation and missions dictate. This fluidity is described as “swarming” by 
some scholars. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt describe swarming in their 2000 
RAND study, “Swarming & the Future of Conflict,” as:  
[A] deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from 
all directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, 
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close-in as well as from stand-off positions. It will work best—
perhaps it will only work—if it is designed mainly around the 
deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked maneuver 
units187 
Swarming is not a tactic, but rather a doctrinal concept. The hypothesis of 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt is that although forms of swarming have been used 
throughout history (for example by the Chechens and the Boers), the technology 
to fully support it is now available for the first time. The only thing missing then, in 
order to implement such a change of concept is a change of mind.188 Although 
this thesis describes irregular tactics more generally, and does not label it as a 
“swarming” concept, there are significant lessons to be drawn from the work of 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, and that work will be referenced in both this and following 
chapters.  
Another important contribution to the concept of swarming is Sean J. A. 
Edwards 2005 dissertation, “Swarming and the Future of Warfare.” Edwards 
uses a similar definition of swarming to that of Arquilla and Edwards: “Swarming 
occurs when several units conduct a convergent attack on a target from multiple 
axes.”189 Edwards studied a number of historical cases, from as early as 329 BC 
to as late as 2003, to develop a theory and model for swarming. His conclusions 
when it comes to factors leading to success are interesting and useful for 
defining relevant tactics for the purpose of this thesis: 
The bottom line is that when the key components of swarming are 
present—simultaneity and encirclement—and the swarm 
possesses specific combinations of three enablers—elusiveness, 
standoff capability, superior situational awareness—then the swarm 
stands a good chance of winning.190 
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Another factor, which is linked to the detection and/or targeting of one’s 
own forces, is mobility. A high level of mobility leads to several advantages for 
the irregulars: 
 Being able to physically outrun the enemy 
 Reducing the chance of being targeted, by changing positions 
faster than the enemy targeting cycle can handle 
 Achieving surprise by moving into areas quickly 
 Being able to mass and disperse quickly 
Therefore, mobility is critical on several levels. Elements need to be able 
to move from area to area over longer distances in order to avoid being encircled 
and targeted, but also in order to concentrate forces to attack the enemy. Speed 
needs to be balanced against the need for stealth, meaning that in some cases, 
speed needs to be kept low in order to avoid detection. This will be dependent on 
the environment, including enemy observation capabilities. In order to move 
effectively, some sort of vehicle, or mobility platform is needed. The Boers used 
horses, which were uniquely suited to their needs. Their mobility as skilled riders 
allowed them to mass for an attack, while immediately dispersing thereafter. 
Even when the British massed over fifty thousand men to hunt down the Boer 
rebels in 1902, they managed to use dispersion and mobility to escape with most 
of their force.191 Although animals will probably be a less than optimal solution on 
a modern battlefield, there are lessons to be learned: every man has his own 
means of transportation, which gives the ultimate flexibility; the horse is relatively 
easy to hide (even in plain sight); and it has limited logistical needs. Any modern 
mobility platform should ideally have the same qualities.  
Mobility is also important at the local level. Even on the defense, 
movement is critical in order to create uncertainty. The Chechens used this to 
their advantage when establishing their urban defenses in preparation for the 
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Russian attacks. They carried a minimum of equipment in order to be as mobile 
as possible.192 They had prepared passages between buildings in order to be 
able to move as quickly and securely as possible from one firing position to the 
next, as well as to reinforce elements when needed.193 “Mortar crews remained 
on the move constantly. Having fired three or four rounds, they would quickly 
drive away from the area to preclude effective counterbattery fire.”194 The 
Chechens also used vehicles to move between areas in town, as well as to move 
heavier equipment: “Troops armed with anti-tank rocket launchers reportedly 
traveled through the city in automobiles with the roofs and backseats removed . . 
. In mountain towns . . . anti-air guns such as the ZPU-2 and ZPU-4 were 
mounted on truck beds.”195  
Another form of mobility—slower, but still very useful—was the use of ski 
patrols by the Finnish forces during the Winter War. The Finns had perfected the 
use of skis, using them to glide effectively and (relatively) quietly through the 
landscape, while being able to step out of the bindings quickly when needed.196 
Although the speed of ski patrols was low, it was significantly higher than the 
speed of the Soviet foot patrols. Skis enabled the Finnish patrols to move swiftly 
to positions where they could ambush Soviet formations, and then quickly move 
back to the comfort and safety of their own bases.197 This shows an important 
lesson regarding mobility: speed must be considered as both an absolute and a 
relative factor. In relation to the enemy, what matters is to be able to move faster 
than him, both physically and in terms of his expectations.  
This leads to the conclusion regarding principles for mobility: Employ the 
forces in such a way that they are highly mobile, both locally and between areas. 
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Use mobility platforms configured for local terrain and with the lowest possible 
profile.  
The skillful Finnish use of skis to move through the frozen terrain of 
Finland in the winter is also an example of exploiting local geography and 
weather (or climate). The physical features of a nation´s territory need to be 
taken maximum advantage of by the defending force. This does not mean that a 
defense built on IW principles should be bogged down in a series of static 
defenses, but the natural obstacles should be used as much as possible to stop, 
slow down, or channel an advancing enemy. History has proved over and over, 
from Thermopylae to Salang, that high mountains and narrow passes can be 
important force multipliers for a defending force. The same advantages can be 
drawn from dense jungles, swampy areas or rapid rivers.  
Another factor is the weather, or climate. Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote of 
the Transvaal area in South Africa that “there are river beds, but no navigable 
rivers . . . there is a great deficiency of steady natural water supply. During the 
rainy season . . . the naked ground fails to retard the running off of the waters, 
which therefore escape rapidly by the rivers, swelling them to momentary torrents 
. . .”198 This shows that not only the terrain, but also extreme heat, cold, wind, or 
precipitation can be a beneficial factor for the defenders, as long as they have 
mastered how to cope with the conditions. In Finland, the local soldiers had few 
problems tackling the cold of the winter of 1939–40. While many of the Soviet 
invaders were mostly concerned with avoiding freezing to death, huddling around 
campfires, the Finns could move around freely and pick their targets. This leads 
to the principle: The IW defense forces must use local terrain and climate to their 
advantage. They must learn to master the local difficulties, making these 
challenges strengths for the defenders.  
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Linked to the above point concerning geography and terrain, is the need 
for intimate knowledge of the terrain. Not only in the form of general knowledge 
of, for example, winter warfare, but detailed knowledge of the terrain; possible 
travel routes, sources of clean water, possible bivouac areas etc. By having such 
detailed knowledge, units can hide easier, move quicker, disperse more 
effectively, and use their weapons better. This goes for both rural and urban 
terrain. The only way to gain such knowledge is to make sure that the personnel 
in the organization have a local connection to the area in which they operate. 
Ideally, they should be living in the area.  
Another advantage to a local connection is the access to information. 
Although it can be dangerous to the civilian local population to involve them in 
information gathering, there is hardly a more effective way of collecting 
information about a foreign presence in an area. The locals will easily pick up any 
changes to the normal situation. In order to exploit this advantage, the defenders 
need to have established trust with the locals, which that takes time to establish, 
meaning it must be done before a conflict erupts. Principle: Make sure units have 
a favorable local connection to the areas in which they will be operating. 
Inflicting damage to the enemy is almost as important as avoiding damage 
to one’s own forces. This is based on the premise that in IW, the most important 
aspect is to avoid defeat. But in order to continue to be a problem for an 
attacking force, the irregular defenders need to be able to fight and inflict 
damage, as much and as often as possible. There is a strong link between how 
to inflict damage and the tools—or weapon systems—the military organization 
has available. The details of the weapon systems will be covered in the 
technology chapter. The key factor, no matter which systems are available, is 
that the personnel can employ them optimally, thereby achieving the maximum 
effect. The most basic system for any military is the rifle. The Boers managed to 
use this simple tool in such a way that they gained a definitive edge over the 
British forces, which were far less skilled. The Boers managed to acquire first-
class rifles, as well as smokeless powder, but the weapons would have been 
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useless without good shooters: “the men who wielded those weapons . . . were 
mostly tough, hardy frontiersmen who had been riding and shooting since 
childhood.”199 
Principle: Use available weapon systems optimally by training the 
operators to the highest standards possible. 
While using basic weapon systems effectively is very important, an IW 
organization needs to have ways to inflict damage on an enemy from a greater 
distance than what is achieved by small arms fire. This is also one of the 
conclusions from Sean J. A. Edwards study: having a standoff capability is one of 
the three key enablers for the swarm.200 By using weapons with a significant 
range, several effects can be achieved: 
 The threat to one’s own forces due to exposure to enemy 
observation and return fire is reduced 
 The area that might contain threats to an enemy is significantly 
increased, meaning he has less chance of covering it all with 
surveillance assets201 
 The time needed to infiltrate units into firing positions is decreased 
The details of such weapon systems will be covered in the technology 
chapter. The key point, though, is that modern weapon technology needs to be 
taken advantage of. While most guerrillas and insurgent groups that fight using 
irregular principles have limited resources, this does not need to be so for a small 
state´s organized defense forces. Even modern, long-range guided systems are 
cheap when compared to the heavy machinery of conventional forces, and will 
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be within reach for most industrialized nations. This leads to the principle: Use 
precise, long-range weapons to destroy valuable enemy targets from a distance, 
thus creating uncertainty. 
The war cannot only be fought from a distance, though. Some times, there 
are advantages to staying close to the enemy. “Hugging” the enemy has the 
advantage of creating extreme pressure in the form of being able to mass small-
arms fire on his forces. This is a form of pressure different from long-range 
targeting. Chechen fighters used a concentration of fire, as well as a combination 
of weapons, to target Russian armored convoys in Grozny. Small arms fire was 
directed at supporting infantry, while a combination of rocket-propelled grenades 
(RPGs) and Molotov cocktails were used to destroy the armored vehicles.202 The 
other advantage to staying close to, or “hugging,” the enemy is that he is 
normally precluded from receiving fire support from aircraft or artillery. By staying 
within “danger close” distances, the units have to make do with their organic 
weapon systems. This is especially important when fighting an enemy with air 
and artillery superiority. Principle: When the conditions are right, take the fight 
close to the enemy to overwhelm him with fire, and keep him from getting outside 
fire support. 
The last point related to the use of weapons is the least impressive in 
terms of actual firepower, but is still one of the most feared threats on the 
battlefield: the sniper. The value of a single highly trained individual with a 
precise rifle was demonstrated by the Boers, but was even clearer in later 
conflicts. The sniper could be described as the ultimate irregular warrior: 
operating alone or in small teams, killing and destroying valuable targets at 
random intervals, then disappearing like a ghost. In terms of effect per soldier—
or per shot taken—the sniper is almost impossible to beat. Snipers add effect to 
almost all forms of warfare, be it defensive or offensive, operating on their own, 
together, or in support of other units. The Finns knew this and employed a 
                                            
202 Oliker, Russia´s Chechen Wars, 20. 
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significant number of snipers in the fight against the Soviets. They used them 
both independently, raiding in front of their lines, as well as part of the defensive 
lines, shooting specific targets. The snipers were extremely effective. One of 
them, Simo Häyhä, is reported to singlehandedly have killed over five hundred 
Soviets during the war with his rifle—and another two hundred with his 
submachine gun.203  
The Soviets have not only been on the receiving end of sniper fire. They 
used snipers with impressive results on the Eastern front during World War II, 
especially at Stalingrad. Their snipers racked up hundreds of kills in the 
prolonged fight in the remains of the city, often engaging in battles with their 
German sniper counterparts. They even set up improvised sniper schools inside 
the besieged city, expanding their capabilities.204 Still, the Russians seemed 
quite unprepared for the threat from snipers in Chechnya some decades later.   
The Chechens used snipers extensively. They operated both alone and as 
part of patrols, inflicting damage and terror on the Russian soldiers both day and 
night. “A common sniper ploy was to shoot individual soldiers in the legs. When 
others tried to help the wounded soldiers, they too came under fire.”205 While this 
last tactic is probably ethically questionable for most people, these examples, 
nevertheless, show the value of well trained and employed snipers.  
Although the historical examples from the three conflicts studied in detail 
in this thesis do not show the use of long-range anti-materiel rifles, such 
weapons are still an important capacity on the modern battlefield. A well-trained 
sniper with the right equipment can engage materiel targets such as vehicles at 
distances well over 2,000 meters. Such a capability underlines the value of 
snipers even more and shows the potential flexibility for their use. 
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Principle: Use snipers extensively, both on the offense and the defense, at 
all possible ranges and against all relevant targets.  
In order to summarize the discussion of weapon systems and their use, it 
can be stated that the most important factor is to create a threat in as many 
dimensions as possible. By having the ability to target and destroy all the key 
elements of the enemy structure from a range of distances under as many 
conditions as possible, the enemy will be forced to adapt. All that is needed is to 
keep the enemy unsure of what threats will emerge in any given situation. A 
dynamic use of the full range of weapon systems available helps create such a 
situation. Such an approach is what CIA employee Mike Vickers suggested to 
Charlie Wilson in order to reduce the threat from Soviet helicopters in 
Afghanistan in 1984:  
Vickers explained that it was not necessary to look for a single weapon 
to serve as a “silver bullet.” The way to defeat Soviet air power was by 
introducing a symphony of different weapons (authors´ emphasis) that, 
when put together, would change the balance in favor of the 
mujahideen . . . all they needed to do was convince the Soviet pilots 
that this mix of diverse anti-aircraft weaponry existed and was in the 
hands of the guerrillas. Every Soviet pilot would then know that there 
was no one diversionary tactic they could rely on.206 
Principle: Use the full range of weapon systems available, in a variety 
of scenarios and different engagement distances, in order to create 
uncertainty. 
Correct and timely information is a critical component for an effective 
military organization. Sean J. A. Edwards list “superior situational awareness” as 
one of the three key enablers leading to success for the swarm.207 The value of 
maintaining good connections with the local population, and thereby collecting 
information has been covered above. It is also important that all elements of the 
organization understand that they have information gathering as a central task. 
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Without knowledge of the current, it is very hard to predict the future. All available 
technology must be used to collect pertinent information, but technology can only 
take us so far. Humans must be trained to collect and relay information as quickly 
as possible. The organization must establish procedures and systems to refine 
and spread critical information to the units that need it. In an irregular 
organization, much more responsibility and decision-making lies at the tactical 
level, and logically that is where information is needed the most. This also means 
that information must be spread horizontally through the organization, from 
element to element, not only vertically back to a higher headquarters. The more 
time-critical the information is, the more important this horizontal information 
becomes. Such a way of spreading information has disadvantages: The 
information will often not have been analyzed and correlated with other sources. 
Training leaders at all levels to critically evaluate incoming information can 
mitigate these potentially negative effects. Another potential problem is the 
spreading of information that can be harmful to the organization, violating 
operational security (OPSEC). This needs to be countered both by strict 
procedures and the use of encryption technology. Principle: All elements of the 
organization must be tasked to collect and relay relevant information. Time-
critical information must be spread horizontally to other elements at the tactical 
level. 
One of the most important aspects of irregular warfare is the ability of 
different elements of the organization to act efficiently, independent of a 
centralized command structure. Although command and control are not 
necessarily tactical principles, they are such an integral part of making the 
organization function that they belong in this chapter. Command and control will 
be discussed further in the organization chapter.  
If the elements of the organization are supposed to spread “like vapor” or 
“flow like water,” only to reconnect and mass when needed, they need leaders 
who can operate in such an environment. These leaders need to be supported by 
an organizational culture that allows such distribution of authority. This does not 
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mean some halfway “Auftragstaktik,” but fully distributed authority to make the 
decisions and take the actions needed to succeed. Such an approach will scare 
many current officers into aggressive denial, and surely cause many deceased 
generals to gyrate in their graves, but, nonetheless, it is the critical component to 
such an organization´s success. Such authority does not mean freedom from 
responsibility. To the contrary, it means more responsibility. Responsibility is 
linked to authority and will follow the decisions made by the respective leaders.  
The Boers made a very loosely organized military force work, at least for 
some time.  
When called up for service, the burghers showed up wearing their 
Sunday-best clothes, riding their own horses, and answering to 
their own elected officers. Boers fought when and where they liked 
and disregarded orders that displeased them. “With the Boers,” 
wrote one young burgher, “each man is practically his own 
commander.”208  
Although the Boers eventually experienced significant problems keeping 
their forces together, this goes to show that a military organization can function, 
in combat, with a very different set of command and control principles than those 
normally employed in conventional units. 
Another irregular organization experiencing success with a high degree of 
distributed authority was the Chechens during the first Chechen War. Their 
military leader, Aslan Maskhadov, was a staunch supporter of distributed 
authority, even though he had over twenty years of experience as an officer in 
the Soviet Army. His motto was “less centralization, more coordination.”209 This 
approach led to magnificent local solutions, enabling commanders at lower levels 
to execute operations unburdened by unnecessary restrictions from higher 
headquarters. Eventually, this proved to be a problem also for the Chechens, 
with different commanders going in different directions. 
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Do the problems mentioned in the cases above mean that widely 
distributed authority is an impractical, or even impossible solution? Not at all: first 
of all, the deterioration of the organizations happened at a point in time when a 
conventional organization would probably have long ceased to exist. Sooner or 
later, an organization will collapse under pressure. Maybe a less formally 
organized resistance movement´s weakest point is the command and control 
system. Another factor that makes such an approach relevant for this thesis is 
that we are interested in designing a military organization, established and 
trained in peacetime, based on national law and culture. This should mean that 
the cohesion, as well as control systems, would be inherently stronger than for a 
less formal resistance movement.  
There must also be a distinction between strategic and tactical freedom for 
the elements of the organization. The strategy is developed centrally, and 
distributed to the whole organization. All elements must operate within the 
limitations and towards the overarching goals of the strategy. The need for 
coordination is done at the “coordinating level,” (this will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 5) incorporating all the elements needed for a specific operation. When it 
comes to execution at the tactical level, though, there should be as few 
limitations as possible imposed on the operational units by the central leadership. 
Principle: Distribute authority and responsibility down to the lowest levels of the 
organization. 
The final element of this discussion is logistics. Even though this does not 
normally fall under the “tactics umbrella,” it is such an integral part of making the 
organization function that it will be covered here. It is immediately clear that a 
conventional approach to logistics, with a centrally controlled, heavy supply 
system, will not function adequately for a highly dynamic irregular organization. 
Sean J. A. Edwards uses a biological metaphor to explain his idea of how 
logistics may work in a Non-Linear Dispersed Operation (NLDO), which is 
probably the most relevant concept available to us: “in conventional war there are 
a few major arteries feeding sustenance to two opposing fronts; in NLDOs there 
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is a distributed lattice of capillaries supporting noncontiguous pockets and local 
networks.”210 This suggests a distributed logistical network supporting the 
operational network. Sometimes, it might even be one and the same. Elements 
must take more responsibility for planning and sustaining their own logistical 
needs while conducting operations. William D. Shannon, in his 2008 Naval 
Postgraduate School thesis, claims that “solving the puzzle for swarm unit´s [sic] 
logistics sustainment is not insurmountable.”211 He suggests specific solutions 
“via preplanned caches, aerial resupply, or other indirect means.”212 One of 
these “other indirect means” can be local support. Another important approach to 
logistics is to reduce the needs to a minimum. By combining all these methods, 
the elements will be able to operate in the field for extended periods of time. 
Principle: Reduce logistical needs to a minimum. Resupply units through a mix of 
networked solutions, including caches and drops. Use local support when 
possible. 
4. Conclusion 
These are the tactical principles, derived from the IW strategy and through 
analyses of historical examples: 
 Avoid detection by staying below the detection threshold. 
 Be as small as needed in order to avoid detection, and as large as 
needed in order to achieve combat effectiveness. 
 Employ the forces in such a way that they are highly mobile, both 
locally and between areas. Use mobility platforms configured for 
local terrain and with the lowest possible profile.  
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 The IW defense forces must use local terrain and climate to their 
advantage. They must learn to master the local difficulties, making 
these challenges strengths for the defenders. 
 Make sure units have a local connection to the areas in which they 
will be operating. 
 Use available weapon systems optimally by training the operators 
to the highest standards possible. 
 Use precise, long-range weapons to destroy valuable enemy 
targets from a distance, thus creating uncertainty. 
 When the conditions are right, take the fight close to the enemy to 
overwhelm him with fire, and keep him from utilizing outside fire 
support. 
 Use snipers extensively, both on the offense and the defense, at all 
possible ranges and against all relevant targets. 
 Use the full range of weapon systems available, in a variety of 
scenarios and different engagement distances, in order to 
create uncertainty. 
 All elements of the organization must be tasked to collect and relay 
relevant information. Time-critical information must be spread 
horizontally to other elements at the tactical level. 
 Distribute authority and responsibility down to the lowest levels of 
the organization. 
 Reduce logistical needs to a minimum. Resupply units through a 
mix of networked solutions, including caches and drops. Use local 
support when possible. 
The principles described above are intended as guidance to a further 
development of the irregular organization. As was described in the introduction to 
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this chapter, the tactical principles are based on the IW strategy. Building on the 
tactical principles, we will move on to the organization, describing how it can be 
designed in order to support the tactics and strategy optimally. 
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V. ORGANIZATION 
A. THE BASIS FOR THE ORGANIZATION 
A military organization specializing in irregular warfare needs to be 
constructed in such a way that it supports the overarching strategy, as well as the 
tactics, which have been defined in previous chapters. It is paramount that there 
is a connection between these different levels, and that the lower levels support 
the upper levels, and not dictate the outcome. To make this logic even clearer: 
the strategy and tactics must dictate the design of the organization, not only in 
general terms, but in the details of the organizational design. There can be no 
part of the organization that works at cross-purposes with the overall strategic 
goals, or works against the tactical principles. The irregular defense organization 
of a small nation is already working against the odds: preparing to fight against 
numerically stronger opponents. While larger conventional militaries might work 
less than optimally and still get the job done simply due to overwhelming power, 
such is not the case for a small organization. It must be designed to work well, 
even under the extreme conditions that exist in war. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a crisis where an aggressor challenges the 
smaller state’s integrity and sovereignty can be seen as a series of phases: 
incidents, aggression, invasion and occupation. Based on these layers, a 
defense strategy can be divided into different layers of defensive actions and 
capacities to uphold integrity and sovereignty. From this perspective, a state 
should be able to uphold integrity in all dimensions, including air, land, sea and 
the information domain. The air and sea domains are the daily business for the 
Air Force and the Navy. This chapter focuses on the land domain. There is, 
however, no reason to think that the general irregular warfare concept, based on 
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the findings in previous chapters, will not be relevant also in the other domains, 
at least in some environments.213 
Another factor that must shape the design of the organization is linked to 
the main theme of this thesis: defense of small states. Such states do not have 
unlimited resources in terms of economy or manpower. This means that the 
organization must be designed to be lean, achieving maximum effect within the 
design boundaries.  
Technology, or equipment, is an important part of an organization. For 
example, a state without an air force will have to fight differently than a state that 
can rely on air transportation and close air support. The same goes for advanced 
ground-based weapon systems. The level of connectivity in the form of 
communication technology might influence the size and dispersion of the 
different parts of the organization. This does not mean that the technology should 
dictate the organization, just as tactics should not dictate strategy. The 
technology supporting the organization and tactics will be described in the next 
chapter. 
B. PRINCIPLES 
The guiding principles for the organization are based on the analysis in the 
previous chapters, and especially chapter 4 regarding tactics. From the list of 
tactical principles at the end of chapter 4, these shaping factors can be derived: 
 The organization needs to be based on operational teams small 
enough to avoid detection 
 Yet these teams need to be large enough to survive and be combat 
effective 
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 The organization needs to be able to concentrate effects by using 
several of these teams in synchronized ways. The exact way this 
happens is defined by the situation, and will change 
 The different parts of the organization should have local 
connections in order to know their areas well, both in terms of 
geography and population 
 The personnel need to be highly skilled at their different specialties 
 There needs to be a high degree of creativity in the organization in 
order to keep the enemy guessing and unsure of the nature of the 
threat to him 
 Information needs to flow effectively through the organization 
 Authority—and following that, responsibility—needs to be 
distributed down to the lowest levels 
 The need for an elaborate logistic system must be reduced to a 
minimum 
 Boiling the above list down to the absolute essence of capabilities, 
the organization needs to be able to: 
 Collect information 
 Attack effectively 
 Split up into sufficiently small elements 
 Move efficiently and stealthily 
 Regroup 
All this needs to be done in such a way that it can be sustained for a 
prolonged period. 
In addition to these principles, certain other shaping factors will also be 
addressed:  
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 Sufficient parts of the organization need to have a short enough 
reaction time to respond to sudden limited crises; e.g., terrorist 
attacks or other forms of surprise attacks.  
 The need for central enablers in order to support the distributed 
parts of the organization 
 The tendency for widely dispersed organizations to break up when 
being under extreme pressure for an extended period of time 
These principles and factors will be the basis for the design of the 
organization.  
Finally, it is important to remember that the organization in question is not 
designed to be just an insurgency or guerrilla movement. This is a planned, 
prepared, military organization, established and trained in peacetime, just as any 
conventional military. It will work under strict guidelines set by the political 
leadership of the country. Its members will be members of the general populace, 
either based on voluntary duty or general conscription. As a result, the 
organization will not to the same extent as insurgencies generally are, be limited 
by recruitment and growth during a campaign. 
C. THE ORGANIZATION 
The following analysis will look at the whole organization, basing the 
suggestions on historical examples, as well as academic papers. The goal is to 
describe a functional organization from the lowest tactical level to the military 
strategic level. The levels of the organization will, for the practical purposes of 
this thesis, be limited to three: 
1. The tactical core level – the smallest units operating autonomously 
2. The coordinating level – the level responsible for the smallest units 
working in synchronization to achieve their given goals 
 83 
3. The central level – the level responsible for strategic and 
operational guidance, as well as the central enablers for the fighting 
elements 
1. The Basis for the Organization – The Team 
This element is planned as the standard minimum fighting unit. This does 
not mean that it will never split up—it certainly will have to, especially for mobility 
purposes in order to stay below the detection threshold when needed—but it will 
be the smallest basic organic fighting element. This includes the lowest level of 
decision-making authority and responsibility.  
The size of this element (hereafter described as the “team”) must, in 
accordance with the analyses in the previous chapter, be as small as possible, 
and as large as necessary. While this is a somewhat vague description, it implies 
being small enough to avoid detection, and still large enough to have an 
adequate “punch,” as well as resilient enough to be combat effective over 
extended periods of time. This could be described as the equilibrium point 
between stealth and destructive power. 
Looking at equivalents in modern militaries might provide an indication of 
a functional size for such a team. While most modern armies have fire teams 
consisting of eight to ten soldiers, these teams are not necessarily comparable, 
since they seldom operate autonomously, but rather within the structure of a 
platoon-sized element (which often never leaves the confines of the company, or 
even the battalion). More relevant is the size of the U.S. Army Special Forces 
ODA teams, operating in teams of twelve. These teams operate independently 
over long periods, and have organic capabilities both for fighting and 
sustainment.  
Historical examples can also give an indication of successful practices. 
While the Boers initially started out with rather large elements, the Kommando 
consisting of 100 to 150 fighters, they eventually had to decrease the size of 
 84 
these elements to be more widely dispersed.214 Still, the size was probably more 
like a conventional platoon than a squad. The relatively large size of the Boer 
elements might have been suitable due to both geography and the technological 
level of their adversary, the British Army. The terrain obviously allowed the Boers 
to move these significant elements effectively, without being seen, into favorable 
positions. At that time, there were no airborne surveillance systems, and no 
effective tactical-level radios. This means that both detection and communication 
was much harder than it is today. As such, it might have been more useful for the 
Boers to work in larger groups in their time than it is for modern organizations 
using the same tactical principles. 
The Finns in the 1939–1940 Winter War had a very flexible approach to 
element size. This might have been caused by a purely task-organized approach 
to irregular operations, as they were all part of a conventional army, albeit using 
irregular tactics at times. Sometimes, the Finns sent out individual snipers, 
sometimes two-man teams: “Two of Majari´s men formed a hunter-killer team: 
one man carried a powerful flashlight, the other a Suomi submachine gun. These 
two prowled the woods, locating small isolated groups of Russians or individual 
stragglers.”215 Still, the Finns mostly operated in larger groups around platoon 
size. Again, this might have been caused by the terrain, limitations in 
communications technology, or a need for the combined firepower of a larger 
force. Still, it is interesting to see a larger emphasis on smaller elements than in 
the Boer War.  
In the first Chechen War, fifty years later, there was a change in 
organization, compared to the two previous examples. Olga Oliker describes the 
organization in detail: 
. . . nonstandard squads were the basis of the rebel force. Such a 
squad might include two men with RPG-7 or Mukha (RPG-18) 
shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launchers, two with machine guns, 
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and possibly a sniper. Alternatively, it could comprise one man with 
a machine gun, one with an RPG, and possibly a sniper, backed up 
by one or more riflemen, automatic riflemen, ammunition bearers, 
and/or medics/corpsmen. Approximately three such squads, with 
support, made up a larger 25-man cell. The support included one or 
more medics/corpsmen, three ammunition/supply personnel, three 
litter bearers, and two SVD-armed snipers. Three 25-man groups 
made up a 75-man unit. Each of the latter was also allocated one 
mortar crew.216 
Based on the above description, the basic Chechen fighting unit was a 
squad of approximately five fighters. When compared to the larger units of the 
Boers and the Finns, this change seems to be caused in part by necessity, and in 
part by opportunity. The necessity comes from the need to move efficiently and 
unseen through the urban areas, where both the sensor capability and the 
communication capability of the Russians were much better than in the previous 
conflicts. In response, the Chechens seized the opportunity to use simple 
communication technology in the form of handheld two-way radios at the squad 
level, enabling them to coordinate the actions of multiple teams without being 
physically in touch.217 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt also discuss the size of this key building block of the 
organization:  
Since the pod is the suggested elemental force in ground force 
swarms, we suggest beginning with the most basic military unit: the 
platoon of roughly 40–45 soldiers, with ten light strike vehicles per 
pod. Since there appears to be no compelling reason to eschew the 
military penchant for groups of three, three pods would then form a 
cluster . . .218 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt also illuminate an interesting and important factor in 
the design of these “pods”: the question of homogeneity or heterogeneity. There 
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are strengths to all basic elements being similar, but there might also be a need 
for specialization, and complementing capabilities.219  
Edwards takes a different look at the size of a basic unit in his dissertation, 
saying that “These C2 characteristics hold true for all NLD forces: . . . Basic unit 
is the squad . . . Units are semi-autonomous and follow mission-order system.”220 
It must be assumed that by “squad” he means a unit similar in size to a regular 
infantry squad, meaning eight to twelve men. 
In addition to the insight that can be gained from the historical cases and 
the previous academic studies, it is important to look at which capabilities a team 
needs to have. This will necessarily have an impact on the size of the unit. This 
analysis is primarily based on the experiences of the authors, working in and with 
small autonomous teams for a number of years. A capable fighting team needs 
to fill the following positions: 
 A team leader. The task of leading the team must be the primary 
task for a designated person. This person can also have secondary 
specialties, but his main task is to lead. 
 A second-in-command (2IC). If the team is split, or the leader steps 
up to lead several teams together, the 2IC steps up as the team 
leader. The 2IC needs to be fully skilled to cover all leadership 
functions at the team level. 
 A communication specialist, trained in using and maintaining the 
team´s communication equipment (beyond normal user level). 
 Snipers (2). In addition to engaging soft and hard targets, they are 
also skilled in observation techniques. The snipers can work as a 
pair, or individually. 
 A medic, tasked at preventive medicine and treatment of injuries. 
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 A JTAC (Joint Tactical Air Controller) to guide air to ground fires as 
well as direct other externally delivered fires 
 En explosives specialist, capable of both offensive use of 
explosives and mine / IED disposal. 
 Heavy weapons specialists (3), delivering organic fire, ranging from 
recoilless cannons, to mortars or missiles, depending on the team 
setup. 
 An information/intelligence specialist, trained at collection, basic 
analysis and dissemination of information. 
This brings the team to a total of twelve members. The team can easily 
split into two six-man teams or three four-man teams for specific tasks or 
transportation. Each member of the team also has a designated fighting buddy. 
All team members have secondary (some might even have tertiary) tasks, 
depending on the situation. While there needs to be a high degree of 
specialization on such a small team, there is no room for compartmentalization. 
Sometimes, one of the team members will need support by others, and in other 
cases a position needs to be filled by someone else due to injuries.  
This organization is not meant as a set-in-stone template, but more as a 
guide or a starting point for the organization. As the historical examples have 
shown, different conditions might lead to different solutions. The questions raised 
by Arquilla and Ronfeldt regarding the degree of homogeneity of the teams 
should also be evaluated. In some cases, there might be a higher degree of 
specialization in certain teams. On the other hand, there is a level of flexibility 
within the team as described above. The heavy weapons specialist might operate 
a mortar in one team, a guided anti-tank missile in another team, and an anti-
aircraft missile in a third.  
Modern technology is another reason why the suggested team size is as 
described. By employing modern weapon systems, including external fire 
support, a relatively small team can inflict significant damage to an enemy. By 
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using modern communications technology, each person on the team can 
communicate freely and securely with the others, coordinating actions in real-
time. This gives the team itself the option of dispersing. In addition, the team can 
coordinate both offensive action and mutual support with other teams in the area 
(within weapons or mobility range). Finally, modern technology is also a reason 
why the teams should not be larger. The widespread use of surveillance 
technology, from satellites, planes, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and 
ground-based sensors, means that staying below the “detection threshold” is 
harder than ever. For this reason, the size of the team should be kept as small as 
possible, balancing stealth against “hitting power.” 
2. The Coordinating Level 
The coordinating level is everything between the tactical basic element 
and the central level. This is the level—or span—where the central guidelines are 
transformed into action, deciding who does what, and it is where all the 
coordination happens. In a conventional organization this is a huge span, 
involving a series of leaders and subordinates. In a small state´s irregular force, it 
might not involve that many levels or echelons.  
Even though this thesis does not describe the chosen irregular approach 
with its following tactics as “swarming,” there are significant similarities between 
the two approaches. Most of the analyses done on, and descriptions of, 
“swarming organizations” are also applicable for the organization described in 
this chapter. While the authors do not necessarily agree with the fact that all 
attacks need to consist of “several units [which] conduct a convergent attack on a 
target from multiple axes”221, this should certainly be part of the irregular toolbox. 
Neither do the authors agree that attacks need to involve “pulsing where units 
converge rapidly on a target, attack and then re-disperse”222, but again, the 
irregular forces need to be able to operate that way as well. As such, it can be 
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said that swarming, according to the definitions of Arquilla and Ronfeldt, or 
Edwards, is an important and shaping part of irregular tactics, which in turn will 
shape the organization. 
Those tactics that do not fall under the definitions of swarming include 
isolated attacks on key enemy installations, infrastructure or personnel, which do 
not involve coordination in time or space between units. Such activities are not in 
any way contradictory to the tactics or organization based on swarming; they just 
consist of much less coordination and planning between elements. As such, an 
organization that masters swarming will also master these less complicated 
operations. This is why the authors of this thesis base a significant part of the 
analysis of the organization on swarm theory, especially when it comes to the 
coordinating level of the organization. To support this analysis, lessons from the 
historical cases will also be used as a starting point. 
The Boer organization was built on a militia system, based on recruiting 
groups of men to defend their local areas. Their training was rudimentary, but 
their skills in terms of shooting, horsemanship, and survival were excellent. Their 
significant numbers were due “to a conscription system that called upon all males 
between sixteen and sixty to serve in small Kommando units, usually with 100 to 
150 riders in each.”223 An officer, who they elected themselves, led these 
units.224 The commando leaders reported to a general, who then reported to the 
Boer republic commanders.  
Their organization was extremely flexible—it was an example of the living 
swarm that has been described in chapter 4, one capable of bringing together the 
manpower to mount an attack, break up again to move independently, and then 
reconnect at another location.225 Mahan describes this in some detail, portraying 
raids in the Natal territory: 
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These, though simultaneous in execution, and therefore mutually 
supporting, were made by bodies apparently individually 
independent; sharing in this a characteristic commonly met in the 
Boer operations, and facilitated by their individualistic habits of life, 
their knowledge of the country, and their freedom from the organic 
interdependence which to regular troops becomes a second nature. 
Every Boer organization seems susceptible of immediate 
dissolution into its component units, each of independent vitality, 
and of subsequent reunion in some assigned place; the individuals 
passing easily . . . among the population . . .226 
The same lack of structure that aided flexibility was also a problem:  
“Boers fought when and where they liked and disregarded the orders that 
displeased them.”227 Their lack of military structure, which helped them in terms 
of avoiding a conventional approach to operations, impeded their ability to 
function predictably and effectively at all times. This relaxed connection to the 
overall effort also meant that the units were more likely to desert when they felt 
like that was the most sensible thing to do from their perspective. The desertions 
were to put significant strain on the Boers who kept fighting, both in practical and 
psychological terms. Even Boer general Christiaan de Wet´s own brothers were 
among the “hands-uppers” who ended up turning against their own and joining 
the British side.228 “These deserters were our undoing . . .” according to de 
Wet.229 
Mahan was skeptical of the way the Boers fought, apparently because it 
was supposedly a less developed form of war: 
This capacity for undergoing multifold subdivision . . . is 
characteristic, in fact, of the simpler and lower forms of life, and 
disappears gradually as evolution progresses to higher orders. In 
all military performance, it is not the faculty for segregation that 
chiefly tells. It is the predisposition to united action, the habit of 
mutual concert and reliance. By this, concentration of purpose . . . 
and concentration of action . . . is the secret of success in war. 
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Individual, intelligent self direction is not, however, thereby 
excluded. The two are complementary elements of the highest 
personal efficiency; but they must be regarded in their due relations 
and proportions.230 
Still, the concentration of purpose and action that Mahan describes in 
the above quote is exactly what should be strived for. In a way, Mahan´s 
description of the disadvantages of segregation and advantages of 
concentration is almost a description of swarming.  
The Boers were, at times, very successful in their operations. It is, 
however, unlikely that their actual way of organizing themselves is applicable 
today. The reasons for this are the same as were discussed regarding the 
basic unit earlier in this chapter: Surveillance and communication technology. 
Still, there are two important lessons to be drawn from their experiences: 
1. When elements of the organization have a clearly uniting 
purpose, they can work towards a common goal without 
communicating frequently, or undue central control 
2. A lack of formal structure will likely contribute to organizational 
breakdown after prolonged times of intense pressure 
The Finnish organization was unlike the two other examples, in that it was 
based on a completely conventional organization. The fact that the Finns fought 
in a variety of task-organized groups, ranging from pairs to company-sized, does 
not change the fact that they originated in standardized battalions. This meant 
that the Finns to a certain extent could have the best of both worlds: the flexibility 
and creativity of irregular warfare tactics, combined with the proven command 
structure of conventional units. This might be the reason that the Finnish 
organization never fell apart,231 even when under extreme pressure, especially at 
the end of the war. Another explanation for this might of course be that the 
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Winter War lasted only three and a half months, which is a short conflict when 
compared to the years of fighting in South Africa or Chechnya.  
The conventional backbone also enabled the Finns to (relatively) quickly 
move large elements to a specific place, where they then could fight in a more 
irregular manner. One example of this is the battle of Suomussalmi, lasting from 
December 12, 1939 to January 8, 1940: Colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo was tasked to 
handle a significant advancing Soviet force: 
His regiment, JR-27, was now the nucleus of an ad-hoc brigade-
strength task force whose mission it was to destroy the 163d 
Division—not just stop it but destroy it. That was a tall order, since 
the enemy, in addition to being numerically superior, was plentifully 
supplied with tanks and artillery. JR-27, by contrast, had no heavy 
weapons at all, not even a single antitank gun, and was still without 
its full inventory . . . What JR-27 did have was plenty of skis and 
men who knew how to use them . . . If Siilasvuo did not have 
firepower going for him, he had the next best thing: mobility.232 
The battle of Suomussalmi turned out to be one of the most successful 
for the Finns. Under Siilasvuo´s leadership, the Finnish forces 
outmaneuvered the heavy Soviet forces, which were limited to the roads. The 
Finns again established small task-organized elements, attacking the long 
convoy at several places, from several angles at the same time, supported by 
mortar fire and snipers. And then they repeated it all over again, some days 
two or three times a day. Their goal was to cut the road, so that the 163d 
Division could be reduced to a number of less threatening elements.233  
The battle of Suomussalmi might well be one of the better historical 
examples of “swarming” in practice. This was a case of total envelopment, 
superior situational awareness, coordinated attacks from several angles, 
using both close combat tactics and stand-off weapons, and also the use of 
“pulsing” attacks. 
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In the end, Suomussalmi resulted in complete Finnish victory. The 
Soviets lost 27,500 soldiers, 43 tanks, and 270 other vehicles. The Finns, on 
the other hand, lost 900 dead and 1,770 wounded.234 The Finns also 
gathered significant amounts of usable (and much needed) equipment: “four 
dozen pieces of artillery, 600 working rifles, 300 functional machine guns, a 
few mortars and salvageable tanks, and a motley but welcomed assortment 
of trucks and armored cars.”235  
The downside of the conventional organization, upon which the partially 
irregular Finnish effort was built, was precisely that it was conventional. While the 
irregular actions were many, and clearly contributed to delaying the eventual 
Soviet victory, the preponderance of the Finnish army operated in a conventional 
manner, because this is what its organizational structure impelled it to do. When 
operating conventionally, staying static in the pre-established defense lines, the 
under-equipped Finnish forces had to give in to the Soviet massive push—it was 
only a matter of time. The first chapters of this thesis have shown that a smaller 
nation should choose an irregular strategy when attacked conventionally. The 
Finnish strategy was based on a conventional defense, partially carried out by 
irregular tactics. 
This leads to the following lessons from the Finnish Winter War: 
1. A more formal structure, such as normally existing in a conventional 
organization, will probably be advantageous, especially for 
prolonged irregular organization. This formality is in terms of clearly 
defining purposes, command relationships, and dividing tasks. 
2. When deciding to go the irregular route—go all the way. Irregular 
tactics in support of a conventional strategy is still a path to defeat 
for a small state. 
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The Chechen organization above team level has been described in a 
previous section of this chapter. According to Oliker, the basic five-man squad 
was joined by two others, plus a support team, to make up a 25-man cell.236 This 
can be compared to a conventional platoon, albeit slightly smaller. The 
composition of the support is also interesting; apart from the two snipers, they 
were basically logistic support to the teams: medics, litter bearers, and 
ammunition/supply personnel.237 These platoon-style cells were again joined in 
threes, making up a 75-man company-style unit. A mortar crew also supported 
this unit.238  
When analyzing the Chechen coordinating level, it is important to look not 
only at the composition of the organization, but also at how it functioned. 
Although the Chechen “company” might look like a slightly smaller version of an 
infantry company, it operated in a completely different fashion. Again, it is 
important to have in mind the words of Chechen commander Aslan Maskhadov: 
“less centralization, more coordination.”239 The local commanders had an 
extreme degree of flexibility when it came to the practical execution of the 
attacks. Maskhadov trust in his personnel was tremendous, maybe because he 
was very confident in their shared overall goals.  
The second part of Maskhadov´s quote was the key to success, though: 
intense and detailed coordination between units on the ground. The irregular 
approach of the Chechens did not mean that they were unstructured or sloppy in 
their preparations; quite to the contrary. This is how Oliker describes the 
Chechen preparations before the initial Russian attack on Grozny: 
The rebels divided the city into quadrants (the city´s managers and 
planners had been involved in developing its defense). Within those 
quadrants, 75-man units deployed along parallel streets with the 
snipers in covering positions. One 25-man subgroup, which 
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included the unit command, deployed in smaller, six- or seven-man 
formations in the lower stories of buildings along one side of a 
street (to avoid crossfire and to establish escape routes). The other 
two 25-man teams deployed similarly in basements and lower 
stories at the point of entry to the ambush site. From there they 
could seal off the area and reinforce their compatriots, as needed. 
In some cases they also mined the buildings at the point of entry. 
As Russian forces approached, the entry-point teams notified the 
rest of the unit by Motorola radio—one for each six- or seven-man 
formation. Then, the command gave the order to seal the street and 
the attack began.240 
These preparations reveal the level of professionalism of the Chechens, 
probably guided by a number of fighters who had been trained by their Russian 
enemy during their mandatory military service. It also goes to show that Mahan 
was at least partly right, when he stated that a military organization must strive 
for unity, and not simple individualism.241 The keys here are unity in terms of 
goals, tight coordination of effort, and then a large degree of freedom regarding 
all the other details that do not need to be coordinated. 
From the descriptions of the Chechen effort, the following lessons can 
be drawn: 
1. Things that need not be controlled in detail should be left to 
subordinate commands to decide. 
2. Detailed coordination in time and space is key to success when 
several teams are working together in the same area. 
3. A standardized organization seemed to work well for the 
Chechens, providing enough predictability, and still flexibility. 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt´s description of the “pod” and “cluster” has been 
presented previously in this chapter under the section “the basis for the 
organization—the team”: a 40–45-man pod, joining in threes to form a 120–135-
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man strong cluster.242 This is, as Arquilla and Ronfeldt also point to, very similar 
to the organization of today´s infantry platoons and companies. These new 
organizational elements are envisioned to use light strike vehicles for mobility, 
with approximately 4 personnel per vehicle.243  
The similarity to a conventional organization stops, though, at the 
company/cluster level. Arquilla and Ronfeldt see no need for any larger 
standardized organizational elements in their picture of future swarming warfare:  
Simply put, under a swarming doctrine there would be little need for 
the existing array of battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, or 
corps. These forms of organization are designed for delivering and 
sustaining mass on linear battlefields. Swarming is about creating 
pulsed masses of fire and force at chosen moments, not 
continuously. The basic deployment of the swarms should be a 
wide dispersal—a fundamental doctrinal concept that runs counter 
to massing. 
In this view, swarming pods organized into networked clusters, with 
an ability to engage from all directions simultaneously, could 
reasonably be expected to defeat a battalion-sized opponent (i.e., a 
750–900 man force) operating along traditional lines.244 
This idea of just having two standardized unit levels; the pod and the 
cluster, and then forming groups of however many clusters you need to solve a 
task, will probably be deemed impossible by many. The massive span of control, 
and units having to fight as parts of different organizations, will certainly produce 
challenges. These challenges can be overcome, though, by approaching not only 
tactics, but also command and control in an irregular way.   
Edwards states that “It is beyond the scope of [his] paper to detail what a 
table of organization and equipment (TOE) should look like for an organization 
designed for swarming and other NLDOs [non-linear dispersed operations].”245 In 
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spite of this statement, he suggests a number of important ideas for such 
organizations: 
I believe the basic topology of a swarm organization should be 
decentralized network . . . In order to maximize the flexibility but 
also minimize the bandwidth required, the basic topology should 
probably be series of star networks connected between their hubs. 
Each local star network can be called a cluster. Local clusters can 
be connected in a number of ways, ranging from a chain . . . to an 
overall star design, depending on the terrain, enemy, mission, etc. 
The point is the overall organization is very flexible and dynamic - if 
isolated friendly units are encountered they can be added to the 
network and synchronized to start sharing and receiving 
information; if a backbone connection between to two cluster heads 
is broken a new backbone connection can be established with 
another node in the severed cluster.246 
Edwards goes on to say that he thinks this type of organization is probably 
not functional above the company level because of signature and mobility 
challenges.247 He also describes the need for a flexible organization:   
In some missions all the tactical military units might be dynamically 
networked in this manner; in others, perhaps a hybrid 
hierarchical/network organization may be required. Each mission 
and environment where friendly forces intend to employ NLDOs will 
demand a different solution. The important point to realize is that 
units will need to be modular so they can be easily task 
organized.248 
This flexibility is one of the key tenets of irregular warfare. Flexibility and 
creativity must be important elements of the organizational culture. The flexibility 
to use the force needed, in the way that is needed to achieve the goals, given the 
current situation, is the whole idea upon which irregular warfare rests. All the 
historical cases have shown that a lack of rigid doctrine was the best way to 
succeed. Still, it is important to point to the pitfalls of creativity leading to chaos. 
An irregular organization might need an even higher degree of control 
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mechanisms than a conventional one, but not the same type. Sean J. Edwards 
thinks that clearly stated common goals are more important than a conventional 
command structure: “Unity of Command should change to Unity of Effort.”249 
Suggested organization. Based on the lessons drawn from the above 
analyses, it is possible to suggest an organization for the coordinating level. The 
key element will be the twelve-man team. These teams should then be organized 
in groups. The size of these groups should depend on the environment, including 
the tasks, the threat, and the geography. For practical peacetime administrative 
purposes it might be valid to have a standardized setup, but this should not be 
reflected in operational training or live operations.  
Instead of having a dedicated “company” commander with his 
accompanying staff in charge of such a group, the task of local coordination 
should go to the team commander best suited for the task. Any commander 
should know the basics of leading one level up anyway, so this should not be too 
different from today´s doctrine. The team of the group commander then assumes 
a supporting role for him in his new function. The more complex the operation, 
the more the team switches to a leading role, away from a fighting role. For a 
simpler operation, the leading team can assume their normal tasks. The team 
2IC steps up to take charge of the team while the commander is in charge of the 
whole group. That way one person does not lead at two levels at the same time. 
An example of a group can be seen in Fig 1. In this case there are a total of ten 
teams working together, with one central team in lead. All the teams are 
connected to the leader team, and coordinating with the other teams as needed. 
Information flows between teams as needed. 
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Figure 1.  Example of Group 
At some point, either due to the fact that too many teams for one node to 
control are needed for an operation, or that an operation is naturally split 
geographically, several groups can work together. In order to relieve the team 
commanders of receiving too much information, coordination between groups is 
then done at the group commander level. The group commanders also 
coordinate with higher-level headquarters and potentially central enablers as 
needed. An example of such organization can be seen in Fig 2. Again, the lead 
node is decided on the basis of who is the better suited commander.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Example of Larger Organization 
Enabler	
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Some might argue that it is madness to let team commanders lead 
complex company- or even battalion-sized operations. The suggestion is 
something else: that you have potential higher-level commanders who often lead 
teams. The leaders at all levels in the proposed organization need to be highly 
skilled and trained. As they progress through education, training, and experience, 
they should be qualified at different levels. Rank and pay could follow 
qualifications, not position. This way, there will be several potential group leaders 
at all times in the organization. The best suited one steps up and takes charge.  
At other times, there might not be a need for this type of hierarchy. Areas 
can be geographically divided, so that each team or group has its own area of 
operations with a high degree of freedom. A unit might even have several areas, 
with one operating area for the team, and one or more target areas. Several units 
can even share target areas to increase the effect on the enemy. The units can 
then operate freely, only coordinating with neighboring units as needed. The 
same can be done by coordination in time, rotating several units through an area 
with the same tasks. Again, coordination and unity of effort are more important 
than the detailed execution chosen by each team. 
 Local connection. One of the tactical principles derived in chapter 4 is that 
the fighting elements should have a local connection. This is to increase 
knowledge of the terrain, both physical and human, in order to move and shoot 
efficiently and undetected, while also having an optimal situational awareness. 
This means that an adequate number of teams with the necessary support 
should be organized in a geographical area. The size of the total force should 
vary according to the size of the area, the terrain, and the relative importance on 
a strategic level. If needed, an area can be reinforced with elements from another 
area, either permanently or on an ad-hoc basis. This is probably most relevant 
for areas with high strategic importance but low population density. Ideally, this 
should be on a permanent basis, so that the reinforcements have the opportunity 
to train in the areas that they will operate.  
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3. The Central Level 
The central level is where the military strategy is formulated and 
distributed to the operational units. It might also be a level where some units or 
capabilities are held in order to be able to strategically influence. It is hard to find 
relevant examples of the central strategic leadership of irregular operations that 
can be applied to national level defense today.  
The Boers´ Kommando leaders reported to generals, who again “were 
direct subordinates to one of the two commanders-in chiefs of the Boer 
republics.”250 Still, it seems that the central leadership was lacking, and most of 
the decisions on strategy were left to the generals, or their subordinate 
commanders. This lack of direction seems to be a reason why Christiaan de Wet 
and his superior, General Piet Cronje, chose completely different approaches 
when faced with a large British force advancing on their positions at Paardeberg 
in early 1900. Cronje chose to stay in defensive positions, while de Wet chose 
the same offensive irregular tactics that had worked for him before. Cronje ended 
up surrendering to the British with his whole force.251 Such significantly different 
approaches between two generals indicate that the central strategic level was 
lacking for the Boers. 
The Finnish organization has been covered in the previous section. They 
had a conventional organization, which at times fought brilliantly using irregular 
tactics. It is hard to draw any lessons from their military strategic level that could 
apply to an irregular organization. It might be said that the Finnish example is a 
case where employing a defense strategy supported by a combination of 
irregular and regular tactics has been tested. In that case, it is not an example of 
a successful approach, as the Finns clearly lost in the end. 
The Chechens had a central strategy, and it was clearly irregular. Aslan 
Maskhadov, who was their key military leader in the first war, had the gift of being 
                                            
250 Fabian, “Professional Irregular Defense Forces,” 58. 
251 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 133–134. 
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a skilled tactician and strategist at the same time. Arquilla describes Maskhadov 
in his book Insurgents, Bandits and Raiders: “Of all the masters I have surveyed 
in this book, Maskhadov showed the greatest capacity for empowering networks 
and building a concept of operations around the notion of swarming.”252 But 
Arquilla also says that Maskhadov´s lack of control of his network eventually led 
to the defeat of the Chechens: “In this respect Maskhadov´s tale is a profoundly 
cautionary one for those who embrace notions of networking: what you create 
you might not be able to control.”253 
Even though the real problems of the Chechens surfaced after the first 
Chechen war, they are very relevant to this thesis. Winning the first war by 
inflicting so much pressure on the Russians that they finally left did not ensure a 
lasting peace for the Chechens. Different commanders such as Shamil Basayev 
had their own ideas of the future for Chechnya, and ran operations that were not 
cleared with the central military leadership. This again points to a central factor 
when creating an irregular military organization: it initially must be controlled, in 
peacetime, then through conflict, and back to peacetime again.  
The central leadership must establish themselves in peacetime, creating 
the basis for a strong, healthy organizational culture permeating all parts of the 
organization. While the irregular organization is built on authority with its 
accompanying freedom and responsibility pushed down to the lowest levels of 
the organization, this does not in any way point towards anarchy. This freedom is 
based on trust, and trust is earned over time. The central leadership should 
establish a control regime in order to make sure that all elements of the 
organization are up to the tasks they will be given. This control regime goes 
naturally hand-in-hand with education and training, which should also be part of 
the central portfolio. 
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Most important, though, once the organization is established, is the ability 
to make strategic decisions in wartime. This should, as at all levels of the 
organization, be issued as guidance to the different area commanders, with the 
largest possible latitude in the practicalities of execution. Only when coordination 
between areas is needed in terms of time or space, should commanders be 
given specific instructions. The outcomes are what should count, not the who and 
how. 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, there are certain elements 
that might be better retained at the central level. This is either due to their 
strategic effect, or the lack of numbers of personnel or equipment. This does not 
necessarily mean that these elements need to be centrally positioned, but they 
need to be centrally controlled. In some cases, they might also be pushed out 
into specific regions when needed. Examples of such central enablers are: 
 Intelligence services. The organization will generate enormous 
amounts of information. Some of this information is shared directly 
at the tactical level, but it is also pushed up through the reporting 
chain. Someone needs to brief the central decision makers on the 
overall situation, providing them with the best possible basis for 
their decisions. This means there needs to be one central 
intelligence hub. This does not in any way preclude a widely 
distributed intelligence network, with both collection and analytic 
capability pushed down to the lowest levels of the organization. 
 Medical facilities. While the levels of medical training need to be 
very high at all levels of the organization, advanced treatment 
capabilities cannot be distributed below a certain level. Depending 
on the size and the economy of the state, the numbers of such 
advanced facilities may differ, but the most advanced will probably 
have to be centrally controlled. Intermediate facilities should be 
pushed to the regional levels. 
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 Special Operations Forces (SOF). If SOF units are to achieve 
strategic effect, they must be controlled at the strategic level. This 
gives central decision makers the ability to use such forces in such 
a way that they achieve the optimal effect. This can be within 
different national regions, or outside the borders. 
 Air support assets. A small state probably has limited air assets, 
and they should be used where they are needed the most. Such 
assets, for transportation, close air support, and other uses, should 
be centrally controlled, but utilized at the local level. 
 Strategic fires. Some nations might have long-distance missile 
capability. Such assets should be centrally controlled, as it is 
probably a limited resource. Regional units can request such fires, 
and will be supported on a case-by-case basis. 
 Information Operations (IO). Although some parts of IO (such as 
deception) should be part of any military operation, there is a need 
for centralized guidance and planning for strategic IO. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Based on the strategy and tactics described in previous chapters, this 
chapter has presented the framework for a national defense force. This 
organization has been designed from the bottom up to fight according to irregular 
warfare principles, including some of the central principles of “swarm tactics.” 
The organization is based on standard-sized teams, with an inherent flexibility in 
terms of tasks and potential supporting technology. These teams can be joined 
together in groups when needed. A number of groups are located in each 
national region. The size, terrain, and importance of each region will dictate the 
size of the actual force that is designated to a region.  
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The central level will operate on the national military strategic level, 
issuing guidance and providing support. Some enabling forces are held at the 
central level in order to achieve maximum strategic effect. 
Having described the organization designed for fighting the irregular war, 
the next logical step is to describe the technology needed to enable the 
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VI. TECHNOLOGY 
Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men.  
It is the spirit of men who follow and of the man who leads  
that gains the victory. 




Possessing the right equipment can be an important force multiplier for 
military forces, and, on occasion, obtaining the right equipment  is achieved by 
being at the forefront of technological development. After all, technology has 
historically shaped the way combat has been conducted, such as with the 
introduction of airplanes in the First World War. It has contributed to ending wars, 
such as in the example of the use of nuclear weapons against Japan at the end 
of the Second World War. In the previous chapters, irregulars have been shown 
to take advantage of the technology of their time in order to improve their 
performance. One example is the Boers´ use of modern rifles combined with 
smokeless powder to increase their lethal range and hide their firing positions. 
Another example is the Chechens´ use of simple push-to-talk radios to enable 
their networked use of small fighting units. One of the best-known cases of 
irregular use of modern technology is probably the introduction of U.S. anti-
aircraft missiles to the Mujahideen in their war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. 
This weapon changed the whole balance between the Mujahideen and the 
Soviets. There is no doubt that the right use of technology can increase the effect 
of a military organization. 
However, to the irregular force, possessing high-tech equipment is not a 
guarantee for success. Neither is the lack of such equipment necessarily an 
assurance of failure. In fact, some of the most credible opponents of the Western 
world currently, the Taliban, have remarkably antiquated weapons. Most of their 
fighters are equipped with AK-47, PKMs, or RPG-17s. All of these weapons were 
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designed more than fifty years ago. Arguably, the Taliban´s most feared weapon, 
the IED, is generally produced from fertilizer and household items, with the 
simplest trigger mechanisms made out of saw blades and old shoe soles. In a 
way, Afghanistan can be seen as a testbed for the use of technology. The 
Mujahideen managed to hold out against the Soviets in the eighties with the U.S. 
supporting them with Stinger missiles. A little over twenty years later, the United 
States was back in Afghanistan, this time to fight the Taliban and their cohorts. 
Without the use of any significant weapon systems to threaten U.S. and allied 
aircraft, it seems the Taliban are holding their own. This is another indication that 
such technology, although important, is not necessarily a game-changer. 
1. High-Tech Irregulars? 
The fact that technology on its own rarely wins wars does not mean that a 
military organization based on irregular warfare principles should avoid the use of 
advanced technology. In fact, this chapter will point to some examples where 
such technology can be very advantageous. The fact that a nation is defined as a 
“small state” does not mean that it has to be constrained by limited domestic 
technology or economy. In fact, there are numerous examples of small states 
investing heavily in technology, most of the time in support of conventional 
forces. The research in this thesis indicates that these funds could be put to 
better use supporting an irregular organization.  
It is also worth noting that in some of the suggestions that are made in this 
chapter, widely used weapon systems are suggested implemented in the 
irregular organization, but used in non-traditional ways. In a conventional military 
organization, the weapon platforms are often significantly more expensive than 
the weapons they carry. That means that by discarding the platform, but keeping 
the weapons, significant cost reductions can be made, while maintaining or 
expanding the ability to use the weapons. An enemy tank will not react differently 
to an incoming missile whether it is launched from a multi-million-dollar aircraft or 
from a ground-based tripod at a small fraction of the price.   
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Thus, technology investments for irregulars should be considered as a 
potential force multiplier. Advanced technology might not be necessary to win 
wars, it will never be sufficient by itself, but it will probably increase the chances if 
the right investments are made. What is right depends on the environment of 
each nation, including the willingness of political and military leaders to prioritize. 
2. Challenging Technology Investments 
In order for a materiel investment to make sense for the small state, the 
effect of the added materiel needs to be as big or larger than the effect of 
investing the same amount of money in another place in the organization. With a 
finite amount of money available, it needs to be put to the best use possible. A 
new tank, a communications system, or a new personal weapon needs to add 
combat effect to such an extent that the investment can be defended. Too often, 
it seems that military investments are based on a combination of officers wanting 
the best tools that exist to support their niche, together with a defense industry 
more than willing to support a notion of necessity. This search for optimal 
solutions increases the costs significantly, and can impact the balance of power. 
This military-industrial complex is just as real today as it was in 1961, when U.S. 
President (and retired General) Dwight Eisenhower first warned of it:  
In the councils of government, we must guard against the 
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, 
by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous 
rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let 
the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic 
processes. We should take nothing for granted.254 
The challenge is that the different players in this complex relationship 
have differing priorities and goals. While they might all seem to aim at improving 
the operational output, that is not necessarily the case. As described above, 
military officers are often focusing on their own field, competing against other 
similar needs in other services or branches. The defense industry on the other 
                                            
254 Dwight Eisenhower, in his January 17, 1961 farewell address. Accessed November 20, 
2013, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=90.  
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hand is—like any other industry—primarily interested in making a profit. The 
danger lies in the fact that these two interests often converge when the military 
ends up buying presumably the best, and often the most expensive solutions, 
sometimes after a long and costly development process. This can lead to 
dangerous results. For a small state, investing heavily in one field will necessarily 
lead to capability gaps in other areas. Unlike a major power, a small state does 
not possess the overwhelming mass of military force to cover or fill these gaps.  
A logical conclusion from this is that a small state should equip its forces 
with the technology that best enables them to achieve an optimal output. The 
investments must be balanced in terms of covering the whole spectrum of needs, 
as well as in terms of cost versus effect. This will often mean that “good enough” 
solutions must be the goal, acquiring reasonably priced, commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) solutions. 
It has been stated repeatedly in previous chapters that there is a logical 
path from strategy to tactics to organization to technology. The tools—or 
technology (or equipment)—come last in this chain for two reasons: the first 
reason, as described above, is linked to the tasks; there is no reason to have 
equipment without a task. In the same way, it is problematic to have a task for 
which you do not have relevant equipment to help you solve it. The second 
reason is that personnel are more important than equipment. The human, as a 
part of the organization, should be equipped, not the other way around. In a small 
organization, the optimal performance of each individual is even more important.  
3. Employing Domestic Industry 
The whole scope of this thesis is to explore the possible use of irregular 
warfare for small states. Even though irregular warfare has often been used in 
countries with limited infrastructure and technology (such as Afghanistan), that is 
not a limitation for this thesis. Small states can be highly developed, with 
technical expertise and production facilities to compete on the global market. A 
few examples of small states with significant technological expertise include 
Norway, producing missile systems, advanced ammunition and remote-controlled 
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weapon stations for a range of their allied countries; Sweden, producing fighter 
jets as well as fighting vehicles and small naval craft; and Finland, which has 
been a leading country in terms of communications technology for a long time. 
These are only a few examples from one region of the world.  
Such technological capability and knowledge should be exploited by the 
small state to improve its military forces as much as possible. Employing local 
industry makes the country less dependent on large international companies. 
This does not necessarily mean, though, that the small state should think too 
locally, especially if it is part of a coalition. Interoperability should always be a 
factor when choosing technological solutions. However, interoperability does not 
always mean that you have to possess the same equipment as the lead nation in 
a coalition. 
Another advantage of a domestic, well-developed defense industry is that 
a nation is, to a certain extent, self-sustained. Other countries´ export restrictions 
or changing production priorities in times of crisis can create significant problems. 
Domestic production for a state’s own use will not be affected in the same way. 
The involvement of the defense industry must be weighed against the dangers of 
letting its interests shape the development and acquisition processes. 
B. THE TECHNOLOGICAL NEEDS 
As has been described above, the intent is for the technology to work as a 
force multiplier, increasing the effect of a small state’s forces. In addition, as has 
been described in previous chapters, there are some other selection criteria to 
consider before technology is implemented in an organization. These criteria 
require that technology enable the organization, and not be a burden. The criteria 
are: 
 A reasonable cost / effect ratio – as low-cost as possible 
 Limited logistical support needs – easy to maintain or repair 
 Limited special training needs – easy to handle and use 
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 Flexibility of use – can be used in a broad range of situations 
Any equipment that does not fall within these criteria should probably not 
be implemented in the organization, at least not at the dispersed tactical level. 
Some more complex systems might be needed as part of the central enabling 
organization, where it might be acceptable due to a higher level of specialization. 
Based on previous chapters, and in particular chapters 4 and 5, the 
following areas for technological needs can be derived: 




 Communication / coordination / control systems 
Each of these areas will be discussed next. There is a limit to the level of 
detail necessary, since the exact solutions should be considered based on the 
environment, both in terms of geography, threats, as well as available 
economical and industrial resources. 
1. Tools for Information Gathering 
The goal for using this technology is to enable the teams to gather 
information that can be used to impact enemy operations, either directly or 
indirectly. The information gathered must be shared to the extent necessary and 
possible. Technology for information sharing will be covered as part of command 
/ control / communications technology. Information should be gathered by the 
use of the following technology: 
Electro-optical sensors. Employing a combination of traditional optics, 
night-vision sensors, as well as thermal sensors, the teams will be able to detect 
and identify enemy activity without transmitting any detectable emissions 
themselves. The sensors should be a mix of directly and remotely operated 
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sensors in order to enable the teams to have freedom of placement without being 
limited by sensor positioning. Some sensors might even operate autonomously 
for extended periods of time, giving the teams even more freedom. 
Communication sensors. To the extent possible, the teams should have 
the ability to exploit enemy radio transmissions. If not able to listen in, they 
should at least be able to detect activity in their area of operations. It might even 
be useful to have teams equipped with listening devices, transmitting their 
intercepted traffic back to central enablers who can analyze the traffic.  
Elevated sensors. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) should be employed 
in a range of sizes and types. While it might be useful in some circumstances to 
have a few centrally controlled larger UAVs, this type of sensor should also be 
considered part of a “swarm” approach. The teams should be able to employ 
their own UAVs, using them for a range of tasks, including surveillance and 
target acquisition. The user interface for these systems must be kept very simple, 
with limited specialized training needed. Ideally, several teams in the same area 
can share information directly from these elevated sensors, giving them a 
common operational picture. 
2. Tools for Targeting 
The teams should have equipment to enable them to direct organic or 
centrally controlled weapons. The centrally controlled weapons might include 
artillery, long-range missiles, or air-to-ground fire. In order to do this, the teams 
need target designator systems, enabling them to produce exact target 
positioning data, as well as terminal guidance for externally delivered weapons. 
This will probably mean some sort of laser target designator (LTD). 
3. Weapons 
The overarching goal of the weapons technology is to enable the 
organization to degrade enemy capability. Ideally this degradation can be kept up 
until the enemy is defeated. The teams should have as much firepower as 
possible, without degrading their ability to move effectively, or hampering their 
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ability to stay below the “detection threshold.” As described in chapter 4, one goal 
should be to present the enemy with an unclear and confusing threat picture. He 
should always feel exposed to attack, and never feel safe. This means that the 
irregular organization must possess weapon systems that are useful at a variety 
of ranges, and under changing conditions. This “symphony of different 
weapons”255 can be divided in three types:  
1. Direct-fire team weapons 
2. Guided or indirect fire weapons operated by the teams 
3. Centrally controlled weapons 
The distinction between these different types of weapons, especially the 
first two, is not absolute. It is just presented as a way to think in terms of how the 
weapons are used tactically, as well as how they are organizationally positioned.  
Direct-fire team weapons. These are the weapon systems that are 100% 
“owned” and controlled by the individual teams. The goal of these systems is to 
enable the teams to damage enemy capability, as well as protect themselves. 
This group of weapons can further be divided as follows:  
 Personal small arms. These should be as light, and low 
maintenance as possible, with the longest terminal range possible.  
 Sniper systems. The teams should have lighter systems to use at 
medium ranges against soft targets, as well as heavier (in terms of 
caliber, not weight) systems to use at longer ranges and against 
harder targets. Systems with high precision and flat trajectories 
should be sought. 
 Direct-fire support weapons. These weapons can be vehicle 
mounted or carried by the personnel. The goal of these systems is 
to provide the teams with the ability to provide massive amounts of 
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Operation in History (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 304. 
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firepower for extended periods of time. Typically, such weapons will 
be machine guns (light, medium, and heavy), as well as automatic 
grenade launchers of different calibers. They can be used against 
enemy personnel, vehicles (soft-skinned or light armored), or 
aircraft at close ranges. 
 Anti-armor individually operated weapons. These are weapons that 
are used against hard targets, such as enemy tanks, armored 
personnel carriers, bunkers, or concrete buildings. They are carried 
and operated by individuals. They can be single-use such as the 
AT-4 or multi-use such as the Carl Gustav 84mm. 
Guided or indirect fire weapons operated by the teams. These weapon 
systems are also “owned” and operated by the individual teams, using them to 
damage the enemy as well as protect themselves. However, these systems 
might also be used in support of, or supported by, other teams in the 
organization. The weapons are either terminally guided by operators with target 
designators, or by on-board guidance systems, or directed by forward observers 
providing target data. Each team will be equipped with such systems based on 
the environment (geography, threat level, and enemy composition), as well as 
their mission set. When operating as part of a larger organization, the 
composition of the different teams´ weapon systems should be complementary. 
This group of weapon systems can be divided as follows: 
 Light indirect fire weapons, such as mortars. These can be vehicle 
mounted, or carried by personnel. Depending on the type and caliber, they 
can have a range up to around six kilometers. Mortars can be used to hit 
targets that cannot be reached by line-of-sight weapons, due to the steep 
terminal angle of the projectiles. Mortar rounds are also available with 
terminally guided munitions, for use against both soft and hardened 
targets.  
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 Organic precision guided missile systems. Depending on the type, such 
weapon systems have a range from a few hundred meters to over ten 
kilometers. Equipped with GPS or laser guidance, they can be used to hit 
specific vehicles, or parts of buildings, as well as hardened positions. 
Examples of such weapons are modified 70mm rocket systems, as well as 
modified Hellfire missile systems.  
 Light anti-aircraft missile systems. These systems are primarily meant for 
self-protection against enemy fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. A dispersed 
anti-aircraft capability will limit enemy use of aircraft for surveillance and 
targeting, especially at lower altitudes. 
 Light artillery. Although artillery is maybe not the first thing that comes to 
mind for small units, it could be a viable tool in some cases. The 
advantage to artillery is the ability to deliver rounds repeatedly at longer 
ranges. The cost of each round is limited when compared to missile 
systems. The range is impressive: a 105 mm light gun has a range of over 
20 km with extended range ammunition. Modern ammunition with guided 
munitions can contribute to improved precision. Light 105 mm guns have a 
weight of less than 2000 kilos, and thus can be towed by most full-size 
vehicles.  
Centrally controlled weapon systems. These are systems that either in 
terms of range, importance, or scarcity should be considered operational assets, 
and as such should have be centrally controlled. The systems might be in 
support of a part of the organization for a given time, or it might be an on-call 
resource. Protection of these assets is an important factor, since they are 
probably limited in numbers. Examples of such systems are: 
 Long-range missiles. These systems should be used against high value 
targets, based on information from dispersed teams or centrally controlled 
sensors. With extended ranges, they can cover large areas. Depending on 
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the range and type, such systems might be prepositioned at several areas 
across the state, or be moved from place to place in inconspicuous ways.  
 Aircraft, both rotary and fixed wing. Depending on the environment, 
especially the geography and enemy air threat, a small state might be able 
to keep operating aircraft even after an attack. If so, own aircraft can be 
used to support dispersed teams with air-to-ground munitions. 
 Weapon-carrying drones. Although most such systems are extremely 
expensive today, that factor might change in the near future. Having 
centrally controlled drones for targeting as well as information collection 
could be an important resource.  
4. Mobility 
The elements of the organization´s ability to move will impact both its 
lethality and its ability to survive. The enemy will be mobile, and will always be on 
the lookout for stationary targets. The teams must be able to move from positions 
of hiding to advantageous attack positions and back quickly, and with the lowest 
possible profile. They must also be able to move over larger distances if need be. 
An important factor for the choice of vehicles is the need for maintenance, as well 
as the possibility for local repairs. The key equipment needs are: 
 Team vehicles. When conditions allow it, the teams can operate vehicles 
with a group of three to four individuals in each vehicle. Each of these 
vehicles will have mobility, weaponry, and communication capability to 
move individually if needed. The specific design of the vehicles must be 
based on the environment in which they are meant to operate. This 
includes making such choices as armored versus unarmored, wheels or 
belts, and using standard civilian versus specialized military vehicles. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to each solution, based on the 
situation.  
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 Individual vehicles. In some environments, individual vehicles might be 
more useful. The advantages include generally better ability to traverse 
difficult terrain, a lower profile, as well as the ability to split up into smaller 
groups, or even individually. The disadvantages are challenging command 
and control and potentially increased vulnerability, since all individuals are 
engaged as drivers. Examples of such individual vehicles are all-terrain 
vehicles (ATVs), snowmobiles, and motorcycles. In some cases, 
employing a combination of team and individual vehicles might be useful. 
 Small boats. In littoral areas, as well as in inland areas with lakes and 
rivers, the use of small boats can be useful. By using inflatable or 
collapsible craft, these can even be transported as part of the standard 
load on the team vehicles.  
 Light aircraft. Depending on the environment, different types of light 
aircraft may be a viable solution. In complex terrain, it might be possible to 
keep flying small aircraft even though an enemy might have air superiority. 
These aircraft might be used for insertion or extraction of personnel, as 
well as resupply. Specially trained personnel or team members with extra 
training can operate them. 
 Individual equipment. Any equipment that can help the teams move in 
ways that the enemy cannot, will give the teams an advantage. Just as the 
Finnish soldiers used skis to move around and between Russian units 
during the Winter War, low-tech solutions can be used in other situations. 
Skis, snowshoes, or climbing gear can provide significant advantages, 
especially when combined with intimate knowledge of the local terrain. 
Speed is relative, both compared to the enemy´s ability to move and his 
expectation of what the opponent´s ability is.  
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5. Communication / Coordination / Control Systems 
Communication will be a key enabler for the irregular organization. To 
maximize the effect of the dispersed organization, an effective communications 
system is of the utmost importance. That does not, however, mean that the 
organization will cease to be combat effective if for some reason the 
communication system does not work. The core of the irregular organization is 
not the technology linking people; it is the shared culture and understanding, 
enabling each unit, however small, to contribute to the common goals. Another 
way to formulate this is by saying that “unity of command may not be necessary 
in all successful battles but unity of effort certainly is.”256 
When communication systems are discussed, security must be part of the 
discussion. There must be procedures, as well as technical measures, in the 
system, which allows a secure transfer of information between nodes without 
allowing outside access to classified information. This does not mean that all 
information needs to be classified. In some cases, being open about priorities 
and general plans might be used as part of an information operations campaign. 
If the enemy knows that his tanks are on the top of the priority list, and chooses 
to protect them by keeping them stationary, the goal is accomplished. The key 
information, essential for the survival of the teams, is their location and detailed 
plans. This must always be considered an essential element of friendly 
information, and protected accordingly. 
There are several tasks that a communication system should perform, 
thereby enabling the organization to function optimally. This system will probably 
be a “system of systems,” ideally linking the different parts together. However, 
complex communications systems often tend to be extremely expensive, so this 
is one area where functionality and cost must be balanced and weighed carefully. 
The key functions of the communication system are the following: 
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 Providing the individual units with direction and guidance from the central 
or regional level. This could be in the form of intelligence summaries, 
prioritization of targets, changes in rules of engagement (ROEs), or plans 
for coordinated operations. One way of achieving this task without having 
all units actively transmitting all the time is by establishing a “cloud-based” 
system where all this information is posted. Units might “shop” from a list 
of prioritized targets, requesting support if they need it. This system can 
also be used for uploading information from the teams, such as 
information about enemy locations or activity, as well as own status 
reports.  
 Inter-team communication, providing the teams with the ability to 
coordinate with other teams in adjoining areas. This would be the 
command and control net to be used when several teams are working 
together in a larger group. Ideally, this system should provide a platform 
for both voice communication, text transfer, picture and video transfer, as 
well as transfer and sharing of a common operational picture. This would 
enable units working together to share their own positions, as well as 
enemy observations or targets. Ideally, a method to designate targets to 
individual teams with their respective supporting weapons should be 
incorporated into the system. This system would also function to de-
conflict different teams’ efforts and lower the chances of blue-on-blue fire.  
 Intra-team communication, linking each of the team members to the other 
members of the team. The most important element of this system is voice 
communication, although other functions can be incorporated. 
C. CONCLUSION 
As has been repeatedly stated in this chapter, as well as in other chapters 
of this thesis, technology should be viewed as a tool or an aid, and not a goal in 
itself. A military planner at higher levels should strive for a desired effect, and be 
less concerned with the methods used. When choosing methods, simpler is 
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always better from a cost effectiveness standpoint. An enemy tank can be a 
significant threat to one’s own operations. While a “better tank” could likely defeat 
it, an enemy tank can also be defeated by remotely setting off an explosive 
charge underneath it. By employing a simpler, lower-cost method to achieve the 
same goal, money saved can, instead, be used in other parts of the organization. 
This is not to say that modern technology should be rejected. The discussion in 
this chapter indicates that the right technology used in the right way can be a 
force multiplier, enabling irregular forces to achieve more effect against an 
enemy.   
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VII. THE WAY AHEAD 
In war the loser deserves to lose because his defeat  
must result from errors of thinking,  
made either before or during the conflict 
André Beaufre 
 
Is an irregular warfare approach to national military strategy appropriate 
for small states? If so, how can these principles be applied? The analysis 
conducted in this thesis leads to the conclusion that by using the principles of IW, 
combined with a well equipped, trained, and designed organization, a small 
nation can increase significantly the capabilities of its military forces. 
Theory, as well as historical evidence, indicates the need for a strategy 
adapted to the context of the small state. The strategy should be based on an 
indirect approach, which in turn is based on irregular warfare principles.  
This thesis should be looked upon as a feasibility study, built on logical 
reasoning from strategy to tactical principles, rooted in strategic theory and 
historical lessons learned. This work is not intended to be a “blueprint” for 
changing strategy, but to serve as a primer for a healthy process of questioning 
conventional thinking in the contemporary defense debate. Many countries 
currently seem too bound to traditional thinking, lacking the ability to think beyond 
conventional parameters in order to optimize given (national) prerequisites.  
A. IRREGULAR WARFARE – A DIRTY WAR? 
Based on the last decades of conflicts, the tactics used in irregular warfare 
have left a bad taste in the mouth of many military traditionalists. For those 
individuals, irregular warfare is affiliated with illegality and uncontrolled banditry, 
brutality, terrorist organizations, terrorist tactics, and civilian suffering. This 
biased picture is further strengthened in the media, as a part in another war, the 
war of the narrative. 
However, the concept presented in this thesis is built on legality, and upon 
a situation wherein the state controls the military force. In that regard, what 
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differs from the application of a conventional military force are the strategy and 
tactics used, as well as the organization employing these methods. The small 
states´ irregular wars should be waged according to international conventions, 
taking into account the “rules of war.” An irregular defense system, built during 
peacetime, based on well-trained soldiers and well-educated officers with high 
moral standards, will mitigate the risk of illegality, brutality and civilian suffering. 
The overarching goal for the military is to uphold national integrity and 
sovereignty, not to overthrow the government or make revolutionary change.  
Based on history, the problem of illegal activity by elements using irregular 
tactics has been predominant when the organizations have been established in 
wartime, with limited previous military training. This has often been the case 
when a nation´s conventional force has been decimated, and resistance 
organizations have been established on an ad-hoc basis. One such example is 
the development in Yugoslavia during the Second World War.257 
The nature of war is brutal and includes a lot of suffering, whether the 
conflict is conventional or irregular. Suicide bombings, bomb attacks in civil 
market places, and IEDs killing civilian innocents have become integral parts of 
many conflicts. But this has to be put in a context of desperate irregulars fighting 
another kind of war: imposing fear and despair on the population in order to 
prove their strength and gain popular support. In a struggle for regaining integrity 
or sovereignty, the weaker parties in conflicts have resorted to brutal and often 
illegal tactics. On the other hand, reports of drones killing innocents, soldiers 
outraging civilians, missiles hitting schools, civilians suffering from blockades and 
coercive air bombing, are all tales of the modern conventional way of war. The 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are two examples of this reality.   
There is a huge difference between terrorism per se, and the modus 
operandi of terrorism, i.e., raids, IEDs, kidnappings etc. Daniel P. Bolger makes 
                                            
257 See Stephen A Hart, “Partisans: War in the Balkans 1941–1945,” BBC, February 17 
2011. Accessed November 26, 2013,  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/partisan_fighters_01.shtml. 
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an important point on this phenomenon in his book Americans at War.258 Bolger 
separates the mixture by defining the difference between terrorism and 
unconventional methods. “Action against trained, deployed military forces are 
acts of war, not terrorism, although the means employed and groups involved 
may be of terrorist ilk.”259 The difference lies in the intended target, as well as in 
the objectives. 
This takes us to the use of psychological warfare, or the battle of the 
narrative. According to William E. Daugherty, psychological warfare is “…the 
planned use of propaganda and other actions designed to influence the opinions, 
attitudes and behavior of enemy, neutral, and friendly foreign groups in such way 
as to support the accomplishment of national aims and objectives.”260 
The previous chapters have clearly indicated that irregular warfare can be 
effectively employed by a small state against a greater state. In doing so, the 
small state needs to formulate and broadcast a clear message to potential 
adversaries, indicating that “we will fight with every legal means available, 
supported by the population, in order to make you realize that your common 
objectives will be more costly, and exceed the benefits you seek.” Using the 
principles of IW as described in this thesis is a matter of fighting smart, being the 
smart power. 
Whether using conventional or irregular warfare, the fact is that civilians 
will suffer. Modern war is not a “privilege” for a political and military elite, where 
the forces wage war in a well-defined battlefield. A philosophical approach to this 
problem can be taken by asking whether people would prefer to accept the 
oppression from an occupation force, or the dangers of fighting for their 
sovereignty and freedom. History suggests the latter: people are willing to risk 
losing a lot when freedom is at stake.   
                                            
258 Daniel P Bolger, Americans at War 1975–1986, an Era of Violent Peace. (Novato, CA: 
Presidio, 1988). 
259 Bolger, Americans at War 1975–1986, 359–360. 
260 William E. Daugherty, A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore: Published for 
Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University by Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), 2. 
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B. INNOVATE OR CEASE EXISTING. 
 This thesis can be perceived as an urging to innovate: strategically, 
tactically, organizationally, and technologically. The focus is upon innovation and 
change, not downsizing and reduction. In the thesis Effective Military Innovation: 
Technological And Organizational Dimensions, Robin Marling points out the 
interrelations between these parts.261 According to Marling:  
It is unlikely that militaries will innovate technologically and 
organizationally simultaneously. Usually, one form of innovation will 
lead the other, the first creating the demand for the second. 
Sometimes militaries advance technologically first, creating new 
technology and then considering new ways of employing said 
technology: new tactics, new operations and new strategy. 
Eventually the new strategy creates a demand for organizational 
innovation to become fully effective.262  
Marling further explains this statement, saying: 
The overarching lessons are these: technological innovation is 
overrated as a source of military effectiveness; organizational 
innovation is underrated as a source of military effectiveness; the 
best results stem from innovations in both organization and 
technology. . . Continual innovation is what is necessary to stay 
inside an opponent’s OODA loop.263 
  A last factor to consider is the fact that even small Western states have 
interests outside their national borders, either stemming from their allied 
responsibilities, or as part of a preventive defense strategy. Whether one likes it 
or not, several small states are present in the middle of complicated conflicts 
outside their borders. From the perspective of international commitments, the 
conflicts in the last decades in places such as the Balkans, Africa, Afghanistan, 
and Iraq have all proved the need for international forces with an irregular 
mindset. From this perspective, a small state with its military force based on 
                                            
261 Robin Marling, Effective Military Innovation: Technological And Organizational 
Dimensions, (Master’s thesis, Monterey: NPS, 2002). 
262 Ibid, 49. 
263 Ibid, 71 and 74. 
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irregular warfare principles would be most useful and offer a force multiplier in 
terms of understanding both the enemy’s mindset and tactics. This should be a 
very useful starting point for countering irregular threats. 
One motive used by the advocates of conventional forces and tactics is 
the need of interoperability within alliances such as NATO and the EU. The 
interoperability aspect is foremost a matter of command, control and 
communications, not about similar force structure.  
C. WHERE DO WE BEGIN?  
The present defense debate (which is a continuation of a debate that has 
been going on for centuries), is foremost a debate about military spending. 
Money spent is seen as producing an equivalent of military effect. The discussion 
around the assertion that when military budgets are cut, military forces are no 
longer able to perform their given tasks, is covered by the shadow of 
conventional western thinking. This approach obscures the real question: are we 
using the right strategy based on our inherent capacities in order to defend 
integrity and sovereignty? This key question is neither identified nor raised in the 
debate, nor placed upon the current political agenda.  
 So, who should be responsible for raising these kinds of unconventional, 
but important thoughts? First, it is a matter of grand strategy. Questioning and 
ultimately changing a national strategy is a hard process, including confronting 
questions about national priorities, which will affect a state’s foreign policy, 
security policy, and its national defense policy. National priorities can be defined 
by using Colin S. Gray’s “National-Interest Analysis.”264 Even if the analysis is in 
its simplest form, it raises the straightforward question about where to put the 
effort by ranging interests from survival, to vital, major and other interests. This is 
especially important in times of economic cutbacks and uncertainties.   
Even if scattered by uncertainties, a National-Interest Analysis will offer 
the national defense structure planning guidance for the prioritized utility of 
                                            
264 Colin S Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport: Praeger, 1996), 116.  
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military force. Further guidance can be found by using Gray’s principles of 
characteristics of armed forces.265 These thirteen principles include a master, 
capable of winning, followed by twelve desirable qualities in [U.S.] armed forces. 
A short overview will show that a small state with a conventional military mindset, 
when faced with a greater state questioning the smaller state’s integrity or 
sovereignty, will not reflect the thirteen characteristics. To fulfill those 
requirements, a new defense force guided by other than conventional principles 
must be developed.  
So what? The problem is that in the process of conventional military 
planning, advisors and decision makers are often limited by mainstream 
traditional thinking. In the book The Masks of War, the late Carl H. Builder argued 
that factors other than logical thinking are involved in defense planning, including 
sources “deeply embedded in the interests of the people or institutions that 
advocates them.”266 According to the author “there is considerable evidence that 
the qualities of the U.S. military forces are determined more by cultural and 
institutional preferences for certain military forces than by the ´threat.´”267  
 In his book Worst Enemy, John Arquilla examines the ongoing “war over 
war,”268 i.e., the war between traditionalists and reformists, and the 
consequences for U.S military capability in the future. According to Arquilla “The 
real problem lies not in Congress or corporations but with the military, whose 
professional expertise is trusted by both these sets of actors, as well as by the 
American people and the President.”269 Arquilla’s point is that the military has a 
responsibility, which includes creative and unconventional thinking, when current 
doctrines, strategies, and tactics no longer are adapted to its purpose: be that to 
win the war on terror or defend sovereignty.   
                                            
265 Ibid, 124. 
266 Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War – American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis 
(Johns Hopkins University press: Baltimore, 1989), 4. 
267 Builder, The Masks of War, 8. 
268 John, Arquilla, Worst Enemy – the Reluctant Transformation of the American Military 
(Chicago:Ivan R. Doe, 2008), x. 
269 Arquilla, The Worst Enemy, 230. 
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The military-industrial complex is built on a long tradition with the 
motivations to serve as an employer, create profits, as well as secure the state’s 
ability to be independent and the allies’ need to remain dependent. The military-
industrial complex has, indirectly, a great influence on the chosen strategy. On 
the other hand, as discussed in chapter 6, there are alternatives, another market, 
to redirect this complex into supporting a chosen strategy.     
D. STEP BY STEP – THE WAY AHEAD 
 This thesis suggests that small nations should evaluate their choice of 
strategy. The following topics would further expound the recommendation in this 
thesis:   
War gaming and computer simulations. Based on the concept presented 
in this thesis, war gaming would further shed light on the recommended strategy 
and tactics. At the strategic level, this could be done by tabletop exercises. The 
war gaming should highlight the factors identified in chapters 2 and 3 concerning 
an indirect strategy and irregular warfare principles. Questions that should be 
discussed include the following: 
 The application of Beaufre’s two maneuvers, the exterior and the interior: 
how can freedom of action be achieved, how can a conflict be prolonged 
and spread, thus and making it too costly to the enemy? 
 How should Liddell Hart’s ideas of economy of force and psychological 
blows be applied? 
 How can Arreguín-Toft’s factors concerning interests and vulnerabilities, 
be applied, exploiting political vulnerabilities and prolonging the conflict? 
 How should PSYWAR be applied to support both the exterior and interior 
maneuver and win the battle of the narrative?  
 How can national cohesion be strengthened and maintained?  
 
These are just a few of the questions that should be highlighted on the 
strategic level to better understand the meaning of indirect strategy, irregular 
warfare principles, and the defensive-offensive method suggested by this thesis.  
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 At the military operational and tactical levels, war gaming could be done 
by both computer simulations and practical exercises, testing the use of irregular 
warfare principles and the tactical principles discussed in chapters 3 and 4, as 
well as the organization and equipment described in chapters 5 and 6. The 
following should be addressed: 
 How should the IW principles be implemented in a specific nation, 
incorporating specific national interests as well as the local environment? 
 What are the effects, in comparison to conventional strategies 
 To what extent should swarm tactics be incorporated?  
 How could a system be designed to create intelligence and information 
advantages? 
 What is the impact of leadership? Are we looking for new kinds of 
leaders? 
 The authors of this thesis stress the need for education and training before 
undertaking any serious war gaming. History is a strong indicator of the 
usefulness of irregular warfare. The goals of such war gaming should be to refine 
and develop a concept based on the strengths of irregular warfare, not to 
emphasize potential weaknesses. Thus, the personnel involved should be 
motivated to make such a concept work optimally. 
 The economic aspects. The recommendations concerning lighter forces 
should be explored, including calculations of the associated costs of such an 
organization. Such calculations must be done both from the perspectives of initial 
investments and continued operations. The goal of this thesis has not been to 
show the potential savings from transitioning to an irregular concept, rather the 
potential for increased effect. To that end, any reductions in spending should be 
used in order to maximize the effect within the military organization.  
 Reconsider compulsory service versus professional forces. Several small 
states have gone away from mandatory military service for all (male) citizens. 
Instead, they have established professional standing military forces. The results 
in all these cases have been significant reductions in numbers. While it has often 
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been argued that the result is an increase in capability due to higher proficiency 
and more experience, in many cases that is at best only part of the truth. There is 
a threshold to how few soldiers a nation can have and still have a credible 
military capacity. Although it is often proclaimed “quality is better than quantity,” 
this is not a question of one or the other. Wars have been won with drafted 
soldiers and volunteers with limited experience and training. Quantity also holds 
a quality. For a small state, compulsory military service might be the only way to 
uphold a military with an adequate size. This does not mean that there is no 
room for professionals, only that there needs to be a balanced approach. A small 
state can have a flexible organization, based on a mix of standing and reserve 
forces. These can be differentiated based on training levels with corresponding 
demands on readiness. That way, the state can handle immediate challenges of 
limited scope, but also expand to handle large, longer term challenges. 
Resistance movements. This thesis has focused on military irregular 
warfare, but as a prolongation of a “total war,” a coordination and continuation of 
the conflict by resistance forces should be considered.270 A military based on 
irregular warfare principles should be more adaptable to a post-occupation 
situation than a conventional organization. This creates a layered approach to 
national defense. War, in the context of sovereignty (or total war), is not a 
“privilege” for a chosen few politicians and the military. It is a matter of 
concentrating all national efforts for the survival of the state. That is one of the 
central points in irregular warfare: the military and civilian organizations working 
side by side. 
  
                                            
270 Resistance movements are nothing new. During World War II, both the U.S. and Great 
Britain established resistance movements in parts of occupied Europe. During the Cold War, 
stay-behind organizations were established in most Western European countries. (Authors´ 
remark). 
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    At the end of the day, for the small state it is all about being a smart 
power. The great powers may be able to persist in their adherence to old, costly 
ways. Small states have no such luxury; and so necessity drives them to 
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